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EXCECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report is a follow-up to Peace-building Strategies for Afghanistan, which we 
prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2002, soon after the 
Bonn meeting that established a transitional regime for Afghanistan. The present 
study assesses the developments since then.  
 
 
Criteria for Assessment  
 
By what standards should the policies pursued in Afghanistan during the past two 
years be judged? Three standards are relevant, ranging from the simple to the 
complex: 
 
· The text of the Bonn Agreement itself: Were the goals outlined in the 
Agreement met and the strategies followed? Was the timetable adhered to? 
· The relevance of the Bonn Agreement to the Afghan situation: Was the Bonn 
Agreement a good script for creating security and rebuilding the Afghan state 
and economy?  
· The implicit political and ethical standards of intervention to change a regime: 
Did the intervention and related assistance strategies improve the political, 
socio-economic and security situation in Afghanistan? 
 
 
The Balance Sheet 
 
As the title of the present study suggests, conflict has been embedded in the process of 
rebuilding the Afghan state and economy. Nevertheless, relative peace has been 
maintained in large parts of the country. The political arena has been reestablished 
and functions as a forum for resolving conflict. Relief programs are being replaced by 
a coherent reconstruction policy. These are significant achievements. They reflect a 
very substantial international commitment to prevent Afghanistan from backsliding 
into civil war or anarchy, as well as the determination of most Afghans to use the war 
against the Taliban as a stepping stone towards greater peace and development. 
 
The transitional administration struggled from the beginning with the implications of 
being a foreign- installed and foreign-financed government. Afghans quickly noted 
that the design for reconstruction and state building was laid out in New York, Bonn 
and Tokyo, rather than in their own country. While the importance of foreign 
assistance to maintain stability and start reconstruction is appreciated, the dependence 
on the international community conflicts with the declared principle that Afghans 
should be ‘in the driver’s seat.’ Partly as a result, the transitional administration 
continues to face a basic legitimacy problem.  
 
The reconstruction policy aims to create rapid growth in a short time, ostensibly to 
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a ‘narco-mafia state,’ as the Minister of Finance 
emphasizes. This strategy entails a very high dependence on external funds, thus 
reinforcing concerns about dependence, sustainability and legitimacy. Significant 
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wealth is in fact generated within the country, but largely in the black economy or in 
any case outside the taxation reach of the central government. Failure by Kabul to 
collect revenues is rapidly recreating the classic conditions of a foreign-financed 
‘rentier state.’ While a familiar phenomenon in Afghan history, heavy dependence on 
foreign funds encourages accountability towards foreign donors rather than toward the 
Afghan people. As such, it runs counter to the basic principles of democratic 
development. A longer time-frame for reconstruction, allowing for greater local 
capacity building and institutional reform in the governance sector, would be more 
conducive to the development of a locally accountable and hence democratic state.  
 
Reconstruction programs are framed within a coherent, market-driven model of 
economic policy. The rationale is to create rapid growth, with much less concern for 
the likely negative consequences in terms of inequality and social and political 
exclusion. The downside effects of a market approach are particularly worrying in 
Afghanistan. A conflictual ‘post-conflict’ situation suggests that inclusiveness and 
equity in the distribution of the peace dividend should be emphasized instead. 
Importantly, an unbalanced market approach to reconstruction will likely leave the 
most insecure areas behind. At present these are some Pashtun provinces in the South 
and the Southeast, which as a result may turn into ‘rogue provinces.’  
 
The difficulty of trying to build peace while simultaneously waging war has become 
increasingly evident. The continued low-level war in Pashtun areas has complicated 
virtually all aspects of the peacebuilding agenda implicitly endorsed in Bonn. By 
collaborating with local commanders to hunt down suspected enemy units, US forces 
are nurturing the warlord phenomenon and related problems. The practice of arming, 
training and paying local militia units was formally reconfirmed as policy in early 
2004. In pursuit of the war, the US has subordinated matters of democratic 
development and human rights to the needs of a close working relationship with 
Afghan military commanders at both the national and local levels. Far from subduing 
the militants, however, the Coalition forces have faced increasing attacks, as have 
‘soft targets’ in their areas of operation. The result has been generalized insecurity in 
large parts of the area along the border with Pakistan. 
 
Tension persists between responding to the ambitious goals of the Bonn Agreement 
and securing a transparent, inclusive and minimally just process. The dilemma is aptly 
captured in current discussions about whether to delay or hold elections as planned in 
the summer of 2004, at the risk of further alienating groups that already feel left out of 
the peace process. Problematic sequencing in the peacebuilding design includes the 
neglect of demobilisation issues in Bonn, which has hampered the development of 
democratic practices. Human rights have been increasingly marginalized in the name 
of promoting stability. By treating political stability and human rights as sequential 
priorities, the international community compromises the rights element in the original 
rationale for the war to remove the Taliban, and arguably shirks the responsibilities 
that arose from intervention. 
 
The regional context remains critical to matters of peace and war in Afghanistan. The 
role of Pakistan, in particular, is important in relation to the challenge of Islamist 
militants. While Afghanistan presently is developing close and dependent relations 
with the United States and European countries, a case can be made for anchoring the 
peacebuilding process more firmly in the development of good Afghan relations with 
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neighboring states. The Six Plus Two Group was a forum for dealing with neighbors 
as well as with the large powers, but it disappeared with the fall of the Taliban and no 
similar structure has been established since. 
 
Norway has been a small but persistent actor in Afghanistan. While traditionally 
focusing on humanitarian assistance, the government in 2001-2 undertook a military 
engagement that consumed more resources than other forms of assistance. Norway’s 
military role was largely defined by security interests related to maintaining a good 
standing both in NATO and its bilateral relationship with the US. The government in 
late 2003 designated Afghanistan as a ‘partner country’ for Norwegian development 
assistance. This decision entails a sustained and considerable aid commitment as well 
as considerable risk, given Afghanistan’s uncertain security environment. 
 
 
The Policy Agenda Ahead 
 
A continued international commitment seems necessary to prevent a return to civil 
war in Afghanistan, but there is no clear recipe for how to move from preventing war 
to creating a better peace. The analysis so far suggests a few guidelines: 
 
· Refocus and limit the war against the militants so as to reduce the negative 
impact on the peacebuilding agenda. Distinguish between the ‘national 
terrorists’ (the Taliban) and the ‘international terrorists’ (which the Afghans 
call ‘the Arabs’), and to the extent possible address the grievances of the 
former through political means.  
 
· Emphasize institutional reforms and local capacity building as prerequisites 
for a large influx of new funds. Focus on the effective use of funds to alleviate 
current problems rather than on counterfactual scenarios of Afghanistan 
becoming a ‘narco-mafia state.’ Recognize that the dividing line between 
‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ is becoming very thin, particularly when 
planning is linked to the Millennium Development Goals.   
 
· Address issues that have been relatively neglected in the reconstruction 
process so far, including human rights, anti-poverty programs, and regulatory 
policies that promote greater equality and equity in sharing the benefits of 
reconstruction. This is especially important to reduce the likelihood that poor 
and insecure areas will become ‘rogue provinces.’ 
 
· Anchor the peacebuilding process more firmly in the regional context, inter 
alia by creating an institutional forum for cooperation between Afghanistan 
and its neighbors. 
 
As for Norway’s role, the Norwegian government should consider consolidating its 
present aid portfolio and concentrating on an identifiable niche where the Norwegian 
contribution can make a difference. This strategy was followed with some success 
earlier, when Norway chaired the Afghan Support Group. At that time, the 
international aid community was moving from humanitarian assistance under the 
ostracized Taliban regime to a comprehensive aid program in support of the new 
authorities. At the present juncture, a niche that would harmonize with overall 
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Norwegian aid policies would be one that gives voice to the relatively neglected 
issues in the present reconstruction policy. 
 
 
 
    ******************** 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the four pillars of the peacebuilding design for Afghanistan 
developed in New York, Bonn and Tokyo – a transitional regime, state capacity at the 
central level, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and light international 
‘footprint’ with the UN in the lead. The national and international context for 
implementing the design is examined, as is the concept of ‘conflictual peacebuilding.’  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the state-building process, which has been informed by three 
principles: establishing state capacity and gradually subjecting the state to democratic 
controls, basing reconstruction on a heavy influx of foreign aid combined with 
market-driven economic growth, and entrusting sovereignty during the transition 
period to the Afghan administration.   
 
Chapter 3 addresses relief and reconstruction policies with reference to programs, 
principles and results. Strategies of capacity enhancement are contrasted with capacity 
building. The two main national assistance and reconstruction programs (NSP and 
NEEP) are discussed. ‘Snapshot’ illustrations from the provinces indicate how 
conditions in Kabul compare with those in other areas.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the political transition process, where the Bonn Agreement 
provided a tight schedule and detailed script for the establishment of an Interim and 
Transitional Authority, the promulgation of a new constitution and elections.   
 
Chapter 5 examines the establishment of the rule of law as a key element in the 
successful transition from war to peace. Developments in three areas are discussed: 
judicial reform, police reform and human rights, including the question of bringing to 
justice the perpetrators of past war crimes and massive human rights abuses.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the principal elements in the security situation: the war between 
the US-led forces and the militants, mainly confined to the South and the Southeast; 
continuing violent conflicts among Afghan power holders in the regions; and security 
problems that confront ordinary Afghan villagers and urban residents. The role of 
ISAF and PRTs, and current plans for modified deployment are analyzed. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the international regional context, and the role of institutional 
structures to mediate in the changing relationship between Afghanistan and the US 
and Europe, as compared to its immediate neighbors. 
 
Chapter 8 examines Norwegian military and economic assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is a follow-up to Peace-building Strategies for Afghanistan,1 which we prepared 
for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2002, soon after the Bonn meeting, 
which established a transitional regime for Afghanistan, and just before the Tokyo pledging 
conference, which promised to finance the process. The present study assesses developments 
in Afghanistan since 2002. The title - Conflictual Peacebuilding - reflects not merely a mixed 
balance sheet. There have been both progress and setbacks since Bonn. More importantly, 
conflict was embedded in the very process of rebuilding the Afghan state and economy, and 
this has been reinforced by the fact that a war continues to be waged in parts of the country. 
   
Preparations for another international conference on Afghanistan are currently underway and 
several studies are being undertaken in this connection. The Afghan Transitional 
Administration (ATA), with the support of the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the UN Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), recently outlined a vision and strategies in a joint report entitled 
Securing Afghanistan’s Future.2 We present our report in the spirit of contributing to the pre-
conference dialogue and the outcome of the meeting.     
 
Revisiting issues of peacebuilding in Afghanistan means assessing the conclusions and 
recommendations presented in our earlier report. Our views then were similar to many that 
circulated at the time of the Bonn and Tokyo meetings, although they differed sharply from 
others. In particular, we concluded that a policy which emphasized that building state 
capacity at the central level was both important and possible, that the warlords could be 
undercut or co-opted, that the international aid community was correct in ‘placing the 
Afghans in charge’, as declaratory policy emphasized, and that aid money should be 
transferred at a pace commensurate with local absorptive capacity. Importantly, this included 
capacity to formulate a policy agenda that could claim some political legitimacy. 
 
This report asks whether our earlier conclusions still hold. More broadly, it examines 
developments during the past two years in relation to the policy framework that was 
established soon after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. The most important of these 
developments was the Bonn Agreement, signed on 5 December 2001, which formulated 
principles of political development and a precise strategy for the transition period.3 The 
agreement was amplified by resolutions of the UN Security Council, and accompanied by a 
set of international assistance mechanisms, including pledging conferences, agreements on 
division of labor among donors, and coordination structures. Taken together, these 
mechanisms formed the initial template for what was variously referred to as peace-building, 
state-building or, more conventionally, the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
 
Following common practice we shall ask whether the stated goals and timetables were 
accomplished or not. But first-order questions concerning the fit between the map and the 
terrain must also be addressed. Were the objectives and strategies suited to the situation on 
the ground? If not, could the ground be altered, or should goals be modified and new 
strategies identified? To what extent was the design laid down in Bonn and amplified by 
subsequent policies suitable for the Afghan situation post-Taliban? 
 
********* 
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A large number of agency reports and project evaluations have been produced on post-
Taliban Afghanistan. The rebuilding effort is one of the most thoroughly monitored and best 
documented cases in recent years. UNAMA has performed important monitoring and 
reporting functions, the Afghan transitional administration has in some areas been a model of 
transparency, with well-developed websites, and international financial institutions, aid 
agencies and NGOs have produced numerous reports, and so have NGOs. The Afghan 
Research and Evalution Unit (AREU) - an independent, Afghanistan-based organization that 
evolved from the previous, donor-assisted Strategic Framework for Afghanistan - has 
produced several insightful studies. Indeed, the importance of establishing such a unit in a 
post-war situation is one of the lessons to be learned from the Afghan case. 
 
The present study has drawn on reports from all these agencies. It is further informed by the 
more academic literature related to peacebuilding in general, and in Afghanistan in particular. 
In addition, the study draws on data collected in Afghanistan recently by the authors, as well 
as insights gained from our engagement with Afghanistan over the past two decades. 
 
The Norwegian team members made various field visits to Afghanistan in the past two years 
in connection with this and related studies. Besides Kabul they visited Kandahar, Wardak, 
Ghazni (Pasthun as well as Hazara- inhabited areas) and Parwan. Most recently (October-
November 2003) team members were in Herat, Kabul, Parwan and Kapisa, interviewing 
villagers, staff of local and international NGOs, foreign diplomats, staff of aid agencies, 
UNAMA, the European Union, and officials at various levels of the Afghan Transitional 
Authority. Since this report reflects cumulative data collection from several field visits over a 
long period, offices and people interviewed are not enumerated in an appendix. 
 
The team worked closely with a number of Afghans in collecting and assessing information. 
We wish in particular to thank Mirwais Wardak, Eng. Mohammad Hakim, Eng. Naeem 
Salimi and Dr. A.W. Najimi. 
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1. THE PEACEBUILDING DESIGN AND ITS CONTEXT 
The transitional structure that emerged from deliberations at the United Nations, in Bonn and 
Tokyo and in related meetings had five pillars:  
 
· an interim governing structure with a timetable for a transition to a more ‘broad-
based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative’ government  
· state capacity to be rebuilt at the central level (with immediate external funding of 
salaries of government officials) 
· large-scale international aid for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes 
· a ‘light footprint’ international presence, which meant a UN assistance mission only 
(with sovereignty residing in the Afghan transitional administration), and a limited 
international peacekeeping force (only in the capital city)  
· the UN rather than the United States would formally take the lead support role during 
the political transition. 
 
The design incorporated the experience of the UN in previous post-war missions (particularly 
Kosovo and East Timor), as well as findings articulated in a recent high- level UN study on 
peace operations (the so-called Brahimi report).4 This was a source of both strength and 
weakness.  
1.1. Conflictual Peacebuilding and the Legacy of the War 
The post-war situation had many positive characteristics. There was a diffuse but 
recognizable yearning for peace among the Afghan people. Despite ethnically targeted 
massacres and some brutal ‘cleansing’ the population did not seem as divided by deep-seated 
ethnic hostilities as was the case in some other post-war situations (e.g., Bosnia and Rwanda). 
The collapse of the Taliban was not followed by violent anarchy, but rather a return to 
customary forms of order on the local level as assorted commanders and traditional leaders 
assumed power (or changed hats). The terrible drought that had afflicted the country since the 
late 1990s came to an end during the first, and especially, second year of peace, producing 
bumper crops in 2002-03. While nobody in Bonn or Tokyo underestimated the difficulties 
ahead, it was felt that a limited international presence and a fairly standard UN peacebuilding 
package just might work. Some voices called for a stronger international peacekeeping force 
to help the transitional government assert its authority over uncooperative warlords in the 
provinces, but US opposition and Afghanistan’s forbidding history with respect to foreign 
soldiers favored a ‘light footprint’ in this respect as well. 
 
Yet Afghanistan in December 2001, when the new Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) assumed 
power in Kabul, was not ‘post-conflict’ in any meaningful sense of the word, and as such it 
differed starkly from both Kosovo and East Timor. Rather, the post-war situation had serious 
built- in elements of conflict that were either ignored or deliberately set aside in Bonn. As a 
result, the subsequent process to build the Afghan state and economy took on the shape of 
what we might call conflictual peacebuilding.  
 
The Bonn Agreement, it will be recalled, included only the victorious parties to a war won 
essentially by the United States. As such it was not a conventional peace agreement. The 
defeated party (the Taliban) was not a signatory, and the agreement had no provision for 
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integrating the populations associated with it. Nor did the Accords cover issues that are 
usually included in peace settlements, above all demobilization and reconstitution of a new 
army. These questions were left to be hammered out in the future as was the issue of the 
division of ‘spoils’ among the victors in the war against the Taliban.  
 
Addressing issues left unresolved by the war against the Taliban - plus the legacy of 23 years 
of previous wars, invasion and revolution - was further complicated by the lack of agreement 
on constitutive principles on the nature of the Afghan state and society. There was a diversity 
of views on fundamental issues such as the structure of the state (unitary versus federal), the 
relationship between state and religion, the nature of rights and the role of women, and the 
position of the monarch. The legacy of the past had left sharp political divisions relating to 
the civil war (1992-96), the revolution (1978) and the subsequent Soviet invasion.   
 
A related difficulty concerned the nature of the interim government. The government was 
installed by foreign forces - the US and its main allies in the war against Taliban - with the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) playing a prominent role. 
Washington had hand-picked the Chairman, Hamid Karzai, whose title was later changed to 
President. Key positions in the cabinet were held by one faction of the winning Northern 
Alliance (the Shura-e Nezar, dominated by the Pansjiris). The regime faced a legitimacy 
problem from the start, particularly among traditionally ruling Pashtun tribes who felt 
excluded and alienated. The psychological impact of Northern Alliance rule in Kabul was 
deeply felt. “We have to take off our turbans when we go to Kabul, or they will arrest us for 
being Taliban,” some complained. Thus, issues of integration, representation and division of 
benefits - central but difficult issues in the aftermath of most civil wars - were particularly 
problematic in the Afghan case.  
 
Within the international community there were different views about the purpose of the post-
war operation. A minimalist perspective (‘nation-building lite’) held that the main purpose 
was to establish a stable, reasonably effective and Western-friendly government that could 
prevent international terrorists from making use of Afghan territory. A more ambitious 
perspective held up a higher standard: the overarching objective was to develop genuinely 
democratic and rights-based governing structures as well as to promote economic 
development. A common denominator was to support the modernist, reformist pro-Western 
elements in the transitional administration.  
 
The maximalist ambitions were reflected in the language of the Bonn Agreement and the 
formal template for the political transition. In practice, key international actors - above all the 
US, but also the UN SRSG - at times acted more in line with a minimalist perspective in 
order to safeguard short-term stability and limit the influence of conservative Islamists.  
These concerns obviously might conflict with the demands of democratic development. There 
were fears that if confronted with such demands, the military strongman in Kabul, Marshal 
Fahim, might stage a coup or withdraw from the political arena, thereby courting renewed 
civil war. Alternatively, parliamentary elections might increase the power of conservative 
Islamists (as happened in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province in 2003). The tendency of 
the transitional regime to develop vested interests in its own continuation added to the 
contradictions inherent in the Bonn script.  
 
Another set of tensions emerged between economic and political strategies. As soon as the 
war was over, and before an interim Afghan authority was put in place, international aid 
agencies started assessing needs, resuming relief operations, and planning for reconstruction.  
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UN political strategists, on the other hand, argued for a measured pace. Only an Afghan 
transitional structure could set legitimate priorities for reconstruction and had to be in place 
before the aid agencies went into high gear.5 Later, when Afghan officials had a firmer hold 
on financial and reconstruction policies, the tension between political and economic strategies 
surfaced in a different form. Criteria of economic efficiency and growth - and a premium on 
rapid, tangible results - often clashed with political criteria such as the impact of aid on 
impending elections, or equity among provinces in the distribution of reconstruction 
projects.6 
1.2. Waging War While Building Peace 
The ongoing war between the US-led Coalition forces and suspected Taliban and Al- Qaida 
militants served to sharpen the conflictual part of the peacebuilding process. The constraints 
of trying to build peace in the shadow of the ‘war on terror’ were numerous. Most widely 
noted was the American and British use of local militias as mercenaries. This strengthened 
the warlord phenomenon, and indirectly the drug industry and the illegal economy as well. As 
villages were caught up in the military campaign of the Coalition forces in the Southeast, 
deaths and detentions of civilians created local resentment against the foreign military forces 
and, by association, the Kabul regime as well. Attacks by militants against ‘soft’ targets, 
notably aid workers, hampered relief projects and economic reconstruction. The deteriorating 
security situation created a preoccupation with short-term stability within the transitional 
administration and among its foreign supporters even when this preoccupation conflicted 
with the broader aims of democratization.  
 
Equally important, the US focus on offensive operations rather than peacekeeping meant that 
Washington for almost two years failed to support calls from Karzai, the UN (both Kofi 
Annan and his SRSG) and many aid organizations for an expanded peacekeeping force. No 
other states were willing to go in without active US support. As a result, the UN-authorized 
peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was deployed only in 
Kabul, and not in the provinces. Two years after Bonn, a minor expansion of ISAF was 
underway, although a possible doubling of the force was being discussed in early 2004. 
Afghan army troops were only slowly replacing locally-controlled militias in the war against 
the militants. The security situation had deteriorated markedly in the second half of 2003, 
especially in the south and southeast, and drug production increased sharply.  
1.3. International and Regional Support 
The Bonn meeting had taken place against the backdrop of unprecedented international unity 
of purpose towards Afghanistan. For the first time in recent history, the neighboring states 
and the large powers - the Six Plus Two grouping in the UN - seemed to be pursuing 
compatible strategies. The US, Russia and Iran had assisted the Northern Alliance in the war 
against the Taliban. After the September 11 attack in the US, Pakistan’s government had been 
persuaded to cooperate with the US against the Taliban and to support the new Afghan 
Interim Authority. In the UN more generally, there was widespread agreement that the 
international community must engage itself decisively in Afghanistan, to prevent the country, 
qua ‘failed state’, from sliding back into civil war and becoming a sanctuary for drug 
production and terrorists. Failure to engage decisively in the early 1990s, it was felt, had 
contributed to the civil war and the rise of the Taliban. With this in mind, the international 
community responded to the defeat of the Taliban by collectively supporting the Bonn 
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process and promised to fund relief, reconstruction and the return of some 3.4 million Afghan 
refugees living in neighboring countries.7  
 
Two years after Bonn, international commitment and unity of purpose remained strong. 
Despite frequent bickering over the magnitude and speed of the aid flows - and the growing 
discrepancy between official Afghan requests and the size of pledges on the eve of a second 
major international conference planned for early 2004 - there was no obvious donor fatigue or 
disengagement. A division of labor for assistance in the important security sector had been 
defined in a sequel to Bonn, in which the UK would take the lead in controlling drug 
production, Germany would train the police, the US would reform the army and the Italians 
would support legal reform. The agreement on a division of labor provided a structure that 
helped tie in the aid commitment. The Afghan-centered structure of Consultative Groups 
(CG) and Advisory Groups (AG) served a similar purpose. By early 2004, the plethora of aid 
organizations, political missions and multinational military forces operating in Afghanistan 
conveyed the impression of a sustained, collective international engagement to rebuild the 
country. 
 
The most important external event to affect the Afghan operation since Bonn was the US 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. On balance, the invasion probably served to strengthen the 
international engagement in Afghanistan. The problems encountered by the occupation forces 
in Iraq demonstrated to many, above all in Washington, the need to ‘hold the fort’ in 
Afghanistan. This seemed all the more important as the security situation in Afghanistan 
deteriorated in 2003 and revived fears that the country was precariously perched on the edge 
of a precipice. To help prevent a slide over the edge towards renewed war and Islamic 
militancy, NATO took over the ISAF command in August 2003. The change signaled an 
important institutional commitment in the security sector. Initial concern that the US 
government itself might reduce its involvement did not materialize. On the contrary, 
Washington in mid-2003 sent a new ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-
American with close ties to the White House, who replaced a career diplomat. In late 2003, 
Washington also sharply increased aid, expanded technical assistance, and actively involved 
itself in the Afghan constitutional process to support its preferred legal design and candidate.  
 
Among the international actors, the US had a singular importance. The Bush 
Administration’s willingness to use the military and economic power of the US to promote its 
interests in Southwest and Central Asia, and its aggressive use of America’s superpower 
status in relation to allies, made the US by far the single most important foreign actor on the 
Afghan scene. The second most important actor was probably the SRSG.  Lakhdar Brahimi 
enjoyed great prestige by virtue of his previous UN activities, including in Afghanistan, his 
role in designing the Bonn Agreement, and his familiarity with Afghanistan. With these 
assets, Brahimi had the possibility of create some space for an independent UN role despite 
the towering US presence. Other countries had niches, the international financial institutions, 
especially the World Bank, played an important role in reconstruction, and the plethora of 
NGO’s added to a bewildering number of aid actors and coordinators (AREU published a 
218-page “The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance,” with a second edition in 2003). 
 
A high degree of international unity did not preclude competition. The US had the advantage 
of having selected the chairman, and later president, of the transitional regime. Other key 
players in the transitional government (ministers of interior and finance) were Afghan-
Americans who had returned from exile in Washington. Other governments had preferred 
candidates and factions as well: Moscow reportedly provided aid to the powerful minister of 
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defense, Iran had ties on both the national and provincial levels, and Pakistani groups – 
including the military intelligence agency, ISI - were said to support remnants of the Taliban. 
As external actors and internal factions repositioned themselves in the reconstruction process, 
a familiar pattern of competitive patron-client relationships with Afghan power brokers 
started to appear.  
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2. STATE-BUILDING 
Creating a central state apparatus in Afghanistan was at the top of both the Bonn and Tokyo 
agenda. With the sudden defeat of the Taliban, the illegal economy and warlords surfaced as 
the principal structures of power. Reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts, therefore, 
focused on restoring an effective and legitimate state apparatus. Independent experts 
supported this strategy as well.8 
2.1. Creating Central State Capacity 
What kind of state should be created? Three guiding principles emerged from deliberations in 
Bonn, New York and Tokyo: the state would be subject to democratic controls, the economy 
should be governed by market forces, and sovereignty would rest with the transitional 
authorities (not the UN, as in the transition in East Timor). With these guidelines, the 
international community immediately set about creating state capacity by funding salaries 
and providing technical assistance to the Afghan Interim Authority. 
 
UNAMA, UNDP and the World Bank took the lead in creating what amounted to emergency 
state capacity at the central level. This included establishing a trust fund for government 
salaries and assistance to planning and financial management. During the first two years, 
creating a capacity at the central state level was first priority, with reforms on the provincial 
level to follow. Even in mid-2003, about half of the government salaries paid for out of the 
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) were for officials in Kabul. By then, a small but 
significant core of capacity had been established, in particular in the Ministry of 
Communication (MoC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).  
 
The Ministry of Finance became the driving force in developing this strategy further by 
asking donors to channel funds to the Afghan administration rather than the UN aid agencies. 
The pace accelerated in late 2002 as the UN-led CAP process for mobilizing funds was 
replaced by the Afghan-structured Consultative Group arrangement.9 This gave some reality 
to the aspiration expressed in Bonn that international actors would have ‘a light footprint’, 
leaving the Afghans in charge. 
 
Payment of government salaries made it possible to resume basic services in some sectors, 
notably education (teachers previously funded by NGOs were put on the government 
payroll). One of the most frequently cited reconstruction results - and possibly the most 
visible and widely shared peace dividend - was the rapid increase in enrolment. Three million 
students were in primary school in 2002, according to the United Nation Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), and four million by March 2003, according to the Afghan Transitional Authority 
(ATA). One-third were girls. By contrast, the total student population during the Taliban 
regime was just under 1 million. 10  
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The Rentier State 
 
Donors were impressed by the early presentation of a coherent and Afghan- led strategy for 
reconstruction. A National Development Framework (NDF) was prepared for the donor 
meeting in April 2002, and a National Development Budget (NDB) was ready for the 
October 2002 meeting. Reaffirming their willingness to fund state capacity, donors promised 
to cover almost two-thirds of the operating budget of $349 million for 2002-2003. Most of 
this was for government salaries. Domestic revenues had initially been estimated at $83 
million, but by the end of the fiscal year (March) the transitional administration had managed 
to collect $132 million. 11 While significant, it was still a symbolic manifestation of central 
state power. The operating budget for the following year had a similar donor-dependent 
framework: domestic revenues were expected to generate only 200 of the 550 million dollars. 
 
At one level, the dependence did not worry Afghan budget officials. In the larger picture, 
$350 million to keep the government running for another year did not seem much for a donor 
community that in Tokyo had pledged $4.5 billion over a five-year period. Yet the operating 
budget came on top of a development budget of $1.8 billion for 2003-2004, which was 
wholly dependent on foreign aid, and this raised broader issues of dependence and 
sustainability.  
 
Foreign funding of government salaries meant a direct dependence on external sources that 
touched fundamental questions of national integrity and legitimacy. That transfers were made 
through a trust fund administered by the World Bank under the supervision of the other 
development banks and the UNDP did not materially alter this fact. Equally significant was a 
vision of future development where the importance of foreign funds remained paramount. 
The costing exercise jointly done by the ATA and international aid agencies in preparation 
for the March 2004 international conference on Afghanistan estimated the proportion of 
domestic revenues to foreign financing to be in the order of 1:8 for the next seven years 
(2004-2010).12  
 
Dependence on foreign funding of this magnitude necessarily generates primary 
accountability towards the foreign patrons and a related sensitivity to their concerns. By 
contrast, collection of domestic tax revenue has an important democratic function by 
encouraging the government to be accountable towards its own people. As a financing 
structure the former is typical of the rentier state that has characterized Afghan history since 
the reign of King Abdul Rahman Khan in the late 19th century. 13 At the present juncture, 
however, a rentier structure works fundamentally at cross purposes to the political objective 
of the Bonn Agreement, which is to create a democratically accountable government – that is, 
accountable to its own people. 
 
 
Capacity Building versus Capacity Enhancement 
 
Efforts to create rapid state capacity by using foreign consultants and subcontractors raised 
similar concerns. Capacity enhancement by contracting foreign expertise had started as an 
emergency measure. The practice was first used in the Ministry of Finance, and subsequently 
adopted in a major way in the National Solidarity Program (NSP), one of the principal 
‘national programs’ in the early reconstruction phase. The division of labor was as follows: 
The ministry - in this case MRRD - formulated policy with the assistance of foreign advisors. 
NGOs bid on projects for implementation. Two international agencies, the German GTZ and 
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an American NGO (Development Alternatives, Inc.) organized the bidding process and 
provided oversight. A similar structure was in 2003 being planned for provision of health 
services.  
 
The Ministry of Finance had pioneered the use of international companies for procurement 
and auditing (e.g. Crown Agents and KPMG) in early 2002. At the Dubai meeting of donors 
in September 2003, the Minister of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, announced that capacity 
enhancement through international sub-contracting was to become a general policy - the line 
ministries would formulate policy, NGOs would implement, and international management 
firms would be hired to do the administrative work of the line ministries through project 
preparation, contracting, and oversight.14 
 
The strategy reflected in part the inoperative nature of many ministries and the difficulties of 
civil service reform. A civil service commission had been established under the Bonn 
Agreement, but two years later had done virtually nothing. As the government explained in 
Dubai, firing civil servants was unpopular and could undermine peacebuilding efforts. Many 
ministries represented political fiefdoms. In one ministry, for instance, 500 new staff were 
added to the payroll soon after the Bonn Agreement, all belonging to one ethnic group. In this 
situation, new technocrat ministers did not to fire incompetent staff but sidelined them by 
working with a small circle of their own choosing. In a ministry that handled large amount of 
donor funds, notably the MRRD, this meant additional staff were needed. The Minister in this 
case hired senior Afghan NGO managers as consultants and used international agencies to 
administer programs such as the NSP. 
 
The enhancement strategy based on foreign contracting made it possible for the Ministry of 
Finance to argue that Afghanistan had sufficient absorptive capacity to receive vast sums of 
foreign aid. By late 2003 the Ministry suggested ‘needs’ were in the range of $30 billion for 
the next five to eight years, almost three times the initial needs assessment prepared by 
international aid agencies for the first pledging conference in Tokyo. The strategy resembled 
an international market model of state administration, and as such was consistent with the 
Ministry’s broader reconstruction and development strategy (see chapter 3).  
 
In preparation for a new international conference on Afghanistan, there appeared to be some 
moves to modify this model with greater emphasis on local capacity building.15 A process of 
selective reform of the central ministries (Priority Restructuring and Reform, PRR) was on 
the drawing board, as was a related plan for core management units within the reformed 
ministries (Program Management Unit, PMU). The key question remained unclear, however. 
What would be the balance of national and international personnel in PMUs in the ministries 
selected for reform? And would foreign personnel be used to build local capacity rather than 
execute policy directly?   
 
By late 2003, there was little evidence that capacity building was being pursued on a broad 
front. The policy discussion focused on reform by importing international administrative 
capacity and simultaneously circumventing the stalled civil service commission by hiring a 
small number of Afghans on merit and a separate salary scale. It may be indicative that the 
costing plan for the next seven-year period prepared jointly by the ATA and international aid 
agencies designates very limited funds specifically for local capacity building. 16  
 
Whichever way policy eventually develops, the general implications are clear. Enhancing 
capacity through foreign sub-contractors might well produce the quick results that are widely 
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deemed important to the credibility of the transitional administration, the progress of the 
peacebuilding process, and the satisfaction of donors. Weaknesses relating to cost and 
sustainability are equally obvious. Reputable international management and auditing firms 
are notoriously expensive (Bearing Point and Deloitte were among those with ATA contracts 
in 2003), donor-seconded experts and international NGOs almost equally so. The Ministry 
has to date provided no estimate of the costs of its enhancement strategy but cost is one 
reason why reforms will be implemented gradually. Technocrat- led ministries that are most 
open to change and ‘speak the language’ of the donors will be first in line for reform. Thus 
MoF, MRRD and the Ministry of Health were initially selected, while the Ministry of 
Agriculture - said to be run by ‘a warlord’ - was not. The selective pattern of capacity 
enhancement raises further issues of equity and priorities.  
 
More generally, by focusing on short-term gains, the enhancement strategy is not an approach 
to capacity building but rather a substitute for it. A policy that deliberately develops state 
dependence on foreign subcontractors - be it agencies, NGOs or private firms - can hardly be 
said to create state capacity. Rather, a dual structure within the Afghan state was by late 2003 
taking form, as strikingly manifested in physical configurations. In the Ministry of Finance 
and MRRD - the two most reformed ministries - the minister with a small staff of mostly 
foreign consultants was located in a compound separate from the rank and file of the 
department. In the case of Finance, the two were even in separate buildings in different parts 
of Kabul. 17 It seems safe to assume that the isolated rank and file of civil servants were 
marginal to the functioning of the ministry and were, mostly, ‘drinking tea’.  
 
If this trend develops, international staff will assume an increasingly significant role in 
administration and implementation of key sectors of public policy, and to that extent also in 
policy. Apart from the minister and some close advisors, Afghan officials in the same sectors 
will mostly form a second tier in terms of decision-making importance, salaries and status. 
Arguably, a structure of this kind will make it more rather than less difficult to build local 
capacity in the future.  
 
Sustained and widespread use of international staff to administer as well as implement 
policies may also undercut the legitimacy of the new Afghan state. One claim to legitimacy is 
the ability to deliver public goods. To validate that claim, the state cannot merely administer 
foreign funds and hire foreign management firms to supervise the (partly foreign) NGOs that 
deliver the services on the ground.  
2.2. The Central State and the Regions 
State-building requires the central state to gradually assert its authority at the local level. Two 
years after Bonn, limited headway had been made in this respect. Critics routinely referred to 
Karzai as ‘the mayor of Kabul’, or the client of the US (he still had American bodyguards), 
while Kabul and its supporters generally denigrated local power holders as ‘warlords’. The 
evolving relationship between Kabul and the provinces was shaped by several factors. The 
question of who controlled the central state cut to the core of the legitimacy issue and was 
important in determining the authority of the central state at the local level. Also important 
were central state strategies to assert itself on the provincial and community level, 
perceptions in the provinces of the transition process, and the political economy of center-
regional relations. 
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Control of the Central State 
 
After Bonn, a main concern, especially in the Pashtun areas, was the degree to which a small 
ethnic-political faction (the Pansjiris) had come to monopolize power at the central level. 
During the next two years, their military presence in Kabul, skilled diplomacy and 
international support enabled them to retain much power, although this  was increasingly 
challenged. The Pashtuns seemed to close ranks against this and other minorities during the 
Constitutional loya jirga, for instance. Divisions within the transitional administration, 
moreover, had grown more complex. Members of the government were identified not only 
with reference to their ethnic background and political affiliation with the main political 
parties or strongmen that had emerged during jihad. Other reference points were used such as 
‘former bureaucrats’ ‘returned from the West’, ‘former NGO workers’, or simply ‘reformers’.  
 
A survey of the background of high- level officials in the transitional administration suggests 
a more complicated picture than a straightforward Pansjiri domination. Data was collected for 
this report on 96 members of the ATA in late 2003, involving ministers and deputy ministers, 
as well as chairpersons and deputies of the state bank and the various commissions 
established by the Bonn Agreement. The results were:  
 
By ethnic groups:18 45 % Pashtuns, 32 % Tajiks, 13 % Hazaras, 9 % Uzbek/Turkman 
and 1 % others. 
 
By political affiliation: 35 % affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami/Shura-e Nezar, 34 % 
recorded as ‘independent’ (former government officials or others returned from exile, 
former NGO workers), 9.5 % belonged to Hazara-based parties, 5.3 % to the 
conservative Islamist Sayaff, another 5.3% identified as followers of the religious 
leader Gilani, 3.5% supporting the northern, Uzbek general Dostum, while the rest, 
7.5 %, were identified as ‘others’.  
 
In terms of ministerial control, however, key persons within Jamiat-e Islami/Shura-e Nezar 
controlled three important ministries (defense, education, foreign affairs) as well as the 
internal security agency (Amniat-e Milli). Members and affiliates held ministeria l positions in 
five other ministries (civic aviation, haj and religious affairs, justice, refugees and 
repatriation and public health) and the position of chairman of the Constitutional 
Commission. They were represented by one or more deputy minister in a total of thirteen 
ministries, of which seven were led by a non affiliated minister. 
 
 
Strategies of the Central Government 
 
The formal administration inherited by the Afghan Interim Authority was quite centralized. 
In the provinces, some civil servants of the line ministries had remained on the payroll as 
well as in their offices throughout years of war and turbulence.19 In late 2001, while in theory 
controlled by Kabul, most were dependent upon local leaders who reasserted themselves after 
the Taliban. This  was particularly the case in areas with strong self-appointed governors. In 
Herat, people said, “nobody has a job without the approval of Ismail Khan.” For the central 
ministries to assert their authority in provincial administration required, in the first instance, 
control over the payroll. Even this was difficult. Funds were insufficient to cover all 
ministries, and the payroll system was in disarray. Even two years after Bonn, the Ministry of 
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Finance was struggling with inflated or unverifiable registers, trying to put in place a basic 
system of payroll identification and oversight.  
 
The central government also used its formal powers to appoint key officials and issue 
decrees, but with limited success. Policy guidelines were issued to provincial leaders, but 
largely ignored.20 Karzai changed governors in some troublesome provinces (in 2003 in 
Zabul, Paktia, Kunar and Kandahar) but, as the new Kandahar governor, Eng. Pashtun, 
lamented, their ability to bring about change was limited as long as the rest of the local power 
structure remained intact. Moreover, the much-publicized change of governor in Kandahar 
did not make other leaders with a strong local power base follow suit, such as General 
Dostum and Ismail Khan. 21 On the district level where so-called second tier ‘warlords’ held 
sway, local power structures remained largely unaffected by the government in Kabul. 
 
In a parallel move, the transitional administration adopted a reconstruction strategy to reach 
communities at the village level directly. The aim was to create a sense of popular 
empowerment, thereby weakening the hold of existing powerbrokers on the provincial and 
district level while simultaneously creating allegiance to Kabul. The main instrument, the 
National Solidarity Program (NSP), was modeled on the World Bank’s scheme for 
’community-driven development’. A flagship of the early nation-wide programs, the NSP 
distributed small block grants directly to the villages, where elected village councils in turn 
would determine spending priorities.  
 
Similar programs have been used elsewhere, but mostly in less conflictual situations and with 
a less ambitious political objective.22 Two years after Bonn, the NSP was just underway. An 
early review found it to be slow as well as bureaucratically cumbersome and costly. 23 Current 
plans call for a four-year program to cover all of Afghanistan’s approximately 20 000 
villages, but only 1450 villages had been included by the end of 2003, and NGO 
implementing partners were on one-year contracts.  One major reason for the delay was that 
the NSP was to serve as a vehicle for the political transition process. Kabul wanted to ensure 
that villagers knew the cash grants were coming from the government, even though NGOs 
were organizing the local consultation process. The Ministry of Finance and MRRD further 
insisted that elections for the village community councils should be by secret ballot so as to 
prepare people for the upcoming national elections.  
 
Long-term involvement seems necessary to generate allegiance or ‘buy peace’. Several 
Afghan villages have been the site of aid projects from different sources over the years, some 
with long-term presence and others on an ad hoc basis. In such areas, the NSP may seem as 
one more project that – while welcome and valuable – does not constitute part of a political 
contract. Uncertainties remain. For example, local village decisions must be coordinated to 
ensure that each village does not build a health center. Sources of long-term funding and 
operating costs remain to be clarified. 
 
More conventionally, the transitional administration tried to work with existing power 
structures at the provincial level to identify reconstruction projects to be funded through 
Kabul. The prototype here was the National Area-based Development Program, run by the 
MRRD and UNDP, where provincial governors helped establish district- level development 
priorities in their respective provinces over a two-year period commencing in 2002. The 
project had a modest start, with plans for funding projects in 10 priority areas that had 
suffered the most from armed conflict, human displacement, and natural disaster.24  
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Views from the Provinces 
 
Limited surveys and much anecdotal information are available on attitudes in the provinces.25 
They show, first of all, dramatic differences according to region. For instance, one NGO 
asked sample villages in different regions to rank the present government compared to 
previous regimes (the Taliban, the communists, and the mujahedin period). While Karzai 
generally fared best - except in Kandahar where the present and all previous regimes except 
that of Zahir Shah were voted down - the attitudes varied considerably by region. 26 
 
The credibility as well as the legitimacy of the Karzai government continued to be 
questioned, especially in some Pashtun areas. Just south of the capital, villagers in Wardak 
portrayed the government as divided and weak. They noted that Kabul was unable to prevent 
armed groups from operating freely in different parts of the country, while in the South-East 
militants attacked foreign and Afghan troops as well as aid workers. In this situation, the 
villagers had few reasons to support a government that at the outset they felt was non-
representative and hence carried little legitimacy. Asked why they did not support the Karzai 
government more actively against the militants, the villagers answered: “What will happen to 
us tomorrow if the Taliban or Gulbuddin get back in power? Can anyone assure us that this 
will not happen?”  
 
Attitudes towards the central government seem strongly influenced by the nature of 
administrative rule at the local level. Uruzgan province in the South is notoriously badly 
ruled, with forcible tax collections, use of torture, harassment of political opponents, and with 
local commanders controlling the police and the courts. Taliban and associated militants are 
said to control several districts. The province governor was appointed by Karzai to put some 
order into the place; in consequence the local people tend to blame him and his government 
for all that is wrong in the area. 
 
In Ghazni province the lack of good governance also rebounds on Kabul mainly because the 
transitional administration has not succeeded in installing better local officials. The governor 
in late 2002 was a youngish commander and appointee of the old mujahedin leader Sayaff 
(who had no position in the ATA), while the deputy governor was a former jihad 
commander, an ex-Taliban official, and a tribal leader. “We hoped we had seen the last of 
these people” a local shura member complained in late 2002. By April 2003 the Hazara 
population in the Jaghori district of Ghazni refused any contact with the governor due to 
Sayaff’s past atrocities against the Hazaras. 
 
In Herat, by contrast, the economy has revived, trade is flourishing, and the local strongman, 
Governor Ismail Khan, ensures public order. While strongly criticized by international as 
well as local groups for his heavy-handed rule, Ismail Khan has undoubtedly more support in 
the province than does the Karzai government. Relative peace and rapid economic growth are 
part of the explanation; so is the appeal of a governor who spends locally much of the 
revenue he collects in this currently very rich province. With control of local administration 
down to the district and sub-district level, Ismail Khan has built a strong base. While political 
opposition mounted during elections to the Constitutional loya jirga, that does not necessarily 
mean popular preference for a governor appointed by Karzai. A Kabul-appointed governor 
would probably come from outside the province and be viewed as mostly responsive to 
Kabul. Local success thus can make localism trump centralism. 
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As seen from the local level, legal- formal mechanisms designed to enhance the legitimacy of 
the central government, such as assemblies and the constitutional process, have limited 
relevance (see chapter 4). While the loya jirga is a traditional institution, it does not 
necessarily entail a great deal of popular participation. Many delegates selected to attend the 
2002 loya jirga felt manipulated, and similar complaints were made in reference to the 
Constitutional loya jirga in 2003. Nor did the constitutional hearing process create a strong 
sense of popular participation. In the absence of more popular empowerment, local 
commanders and other power brokers will remain central figures on the local scene.   
 
 
The Political Economy of Center- Province Relations 
 
These limitations notwithstanding, international recognition and support, and the prospect of 
large reconstruction funds, clearly make the central government a factor to be reckoned with. 
Provincial leaders who wished to deal with the center within a political framework gave 
signals in that direction. Thus, Ismail Khan did receive the general that Kabul sent out in the  
second half of 2003 to take official command of the military forces in the region, although 
the units in reality remained under the control of Ismail Khan and his men. Ismail Khan did 
turn over some $20 million in tax revenues to the Finance Minister, although this was only a 
small fraction of the total revenues he collected, and happened only after Minister Ashraf 
Ghani had repeatedly pleaded and begged. 
 
Local leaders of various kinds meanwhile collected, and kept, most of the revenues raised in 
the country. Kabul received only 80 million of an estimated 500 mill collected in customs 
duties in 2002.27 As a result, they could easily outbid, say, block grants delivered through the 
NSP in the competition for local allegiance. De facto decentralization of this kind was most 
problematic in relation to equity issues on a national level. Even if local revenues were spent 
for local reconstruction and development, as seemed to be the case in Herat, in the absence of 
national redistribution this would worsen existing inequalities among the provinces. Customs 
duties are the principal legal sources of revenue and are concentrated along a few important 
trade routes. National differences in revenue generation are starkly demonstrated by a recent 
AREU/World Bank study. Kabul and Kandahar together generated some 3 billion afs. in 
revenue in 2002 (according to data turned over by the provincial office of the Ministry of 
Finance), while the combined total revenue collected in four other provinces surveyed 
(Badakshan, Bamyan, Faryab and Wardak) was slightly less than 12 million. 28 Given the 
competitive tribal and ethno-political mosaic and widespread poverty, sharp inequities in 
expenditure are a recipe for conflict. 
 
The other problem associated with local control of revenues, according to the Finance 
Minister, is that some 40% of the economy is in the illegal sector, mainly in drug production 
and smuggling (including arms). From a purely economic view, a large illegal sector need not 
be a problem - for instance, an estimated 30% of Thailand’s thriving economy is generated 
illegally from drugs, prostitution and gambling. However, the illegal economy in Afghanistan 
is associated not only with corruption and the drug trade (as in Thailand), and involves some 
local commanders as well as, reportedly, some government officials on the local and central 
level. The illegal economy also undermines the centrist policy approach by financing an 
independent local power structure. Moreover, the US and the Karzai government claim that 
the drug industry helps finance national and international terrorism.  
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Combating the drug industry was a major concern of the transitional administration and the 
international donors, but the UK-led conventional approach in 2002-03 was generally 
considered a failure. Emphasis on law enforcement and a limited program of crop substitution 
did not prevent large increases in poppy production compared with 2001, when the Taliban 
by sheer force succeeded in virtually halting cultivation. In 2003, the UN registered a bumper 
crop of poppy, including cultivation in new areas.29 While additional funds were committed 
to the program for 2004, some new strategies proposed were controversial. The US mission, 
for instance, revealed plans for ploughing up the entire poppy-growing area from North to 
South in 2004, relying on soldiers (to be contributed by Muslim countries to the Coalition, it 
was hoped) for guarding the operation. 30 
2.3. Conclusions 
The centrist approach to state building was in part inspired by a progressive rationale. The 
ultimate aim was to creating a modern, democratic and accountable state for all of 
Afghanistan. Given the legacy of a weak state and fragmented power, there was no 
expectation that the process would be quick or easy. This remains the case. In addition, two 
underlying contractions in the state-building project that were not so obvious at the time of 
Bonn have now surfaced. First, the disproportionately heavy dependence on external funding 
creates an incentive structure where the state has more reason to be accountable to foreign 
donors than to its own people. To this extent, there is a conflict between the aim of rapid 
economic reconstruction and democratization. Second, the guiding principles for state-
building in Afghanistan were formulated outside the country – in New York, Bonn and 
Tokyo – and thus conflicted with the notion that the Afghans would be ‘in charge’.  
 
International funding and technical assistance were initially undertaken as an emergency 
measure to create central state capacity. Two years later, the state remained heavily 
dependent upon foreign funds for both its operating budget and reconstruction. State capacity 
building was based on a policy of subcontracting to foreign firms and agencies, enabling the 
central administration to claim it had capacity to absorb vast amounts of foreign aid money. 
In both cases, short-term emergency measures appear problematic when recast as long-term 
policy. Extensive use of foreign subcontractors raises issues of cost and sustainability. 
Dependence on foreign funds to pay government salaries also touches on fundamental issues 
of integrity and legitimacy. By late 2003, the Afghan rentier state - a familiar phenomenon 
from earlier history - was being recreated. 
Large amounts of revenue were in fact collected throughout the country - fed by burgeoning 
trade, a bumper agricultural harvest in 2003 (including a large increase in poppy production), 
and reconstruction activities stimulated by the return of peace and influx of funds in many 
parts of the country. However, most of the surplus continued to be collected and retained by 
local leaders who thereby shored up their power.  
 
With much international attention focused on Kabul - and the visible signs of a boom 
economy in the capital - the different realities in most the provinces continue to challenge the 
centrist approach. It became increasingly clear that the state-building venture in Afghanistan 
was intimately tied to issues of: 
 
· legitimacy, i.e. of ‘who owns the state’. Despite the use of both formal- legal and 
traditional mechanisms to create authority, the Kabul government still had a legitimacy 
deficit;  
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·  governance, i.e. the ability of the state to provide some security, justice and 
accountability on the local level. The irony was that Kabul tended to be blamed for local 
misrule over which it had little influence, while local authorities often got credit for local 
successes; 
· funds, i.e. funds for reconstruction that might cement alliances and generate allegiance on 
the local level. The National Solidarity Program was a step in this direction, but possibly 
neither sufficiently large nor sustained enough to achieve its political objectives. 
 
State building requiring progress on all these fronts is a long-term process, suggesting a 
perspective of decades rather than years. Meanwhile, pragmatism suggests greater 
recognition of local power structures where these seem to function relatively well or are 
amenable to reform.  
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3. RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Wartime destruction in Afghanistan was uneven - some areas had been heavily damaged and 
depopulated; elsewhere there had been little fighting and less direct damage. The impact of 
the past 2-3 years of severe drought was more widely spread, although some areas (notably 
‘the hunger belt’) were worse off than others. The indirect effects of war were felt throughout 
the country and expressed in widespread disrepair, dislocation and lack of development for 
almost a quarter century. In this situation, ‘reconstruction’ in effect meant ‘development’. 
Recognizing the enormous needs, the international donor community and the new Afghan 
authorities created a comprehensive assistance program designed to yield tangible peace 
dividends to Afghanistan’s war-battered population. 
3.1. The Aid Presence: a ‘Light Footprint’? 
A large international aid presence typically has a major, distorting impact on a poor and war-
torn society. The assistance mechanism for Afghanistan was intended to be different; it was 
to be only a ‘light footprint’ as the Afghans rapidly took charge. Having a UN assistance 
mission rather than direct international administration was part of this logic, as was the early 
planning for an integrated UN mission. Yet the vision of a ‘light footprint’ outlined by 
Lakhdar Brahimi in Bonn and New York was jeopardized when the international aid 
community rushed into Afghanistan to resume old or start new operations - attracted by 
billions of dollars in aid money, massive media interest, and desperate needs on the ground. 
Designed as a standard UN mission, UNAMA lacked the power to control the agencies and 
never became the slim integrated structure that Brahimi had envisaged.31 Similarly, UNDP 
declared in January 2002 that the UN would institute a salary regime to prevent qualified 
local personnel from being siphoned off by the international aid sector (usually to secondary 
positions such as drivers and interpreters), but no corresponding steps were taken to regulate 
the aid market, and the familiar distortions appeared.  
 
As a result, the relief scene in Afghanistan resembled other post-war situations. Problems 
associated with a heavy foreign aid presence were particularly severe in Kabul, where 
enormous pressure on real estate prices and basic services (water, electricity) hurt ordinary 
city dwellers. As the number of NGOs increased and over one million returning refugees and 
IDPs ended up in Kabul, the congestion in the city worsened.32  The so-called ‘white vehicle 
syndrome’ led to considerable popular resentment. Tapping into this, the Minister of Finance 
argued aggressively that donors should channel relief funding through the transitional 
administration rather than the UN agencies. While using a cost-effectiveness argument, the 
main purpose of the ministry was to assert its control over the aid money. As noted in chapter 
3, to some extent it succeeded. The UN fund raising process was adjusted in mid-2002 to suit 
the budget cycle of the transitional administration. Likewise, UNAMA abandoned the 
elaborate aid coordination structure which it had spent considerable time constructing in 
favor of a Consultative Group (CG) mechanism designed by the Ministry of Finance. The 
international relief agencies started to support the relevant Afghan line ministries, rather than 
vice versa. By late 2003, the struggle over funding channels had calmed down. The 
transitional administration had firmly asserted its primacy in principle, and to some extent 
also in practice. At the same time, UN agencies continued to control the funding of large aid 
programs (worth ca 800 million dollars in 2003).  
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In a more fundamental sense, Afghanistan’s extreme dependence on foreign funds and 
expertise made the term ‘light footprint’ seem misplaced. Two-thirds of the operating budget 
for the fiscal year 2003-2004 and the entire first national development budget were financed 
by foreign aid. International technical advisors were assigned to most of the ministries in 
Kabul, partly also in the provinces. Donors and NGOs participated in, and sometimes 
chaired, the CG meetings on aid coordination. Although the total number of aid actors was 
very large, which in theory should give the ATA considerable room for maneuver, a small 
number of donors accounted for most of the assistance. By the beginning of the 2003-2004 
fiscal year (SY 1832), US funds constituted over one-third of the entire national development 
budget ($600 million out of 1.7 billion). A few months later Washington announced that it 
would add another 1.6 billion under the ‘Accelerating Success’ program to be disbursed by 
the middle of 2004. Of this amount, 100 million was allocated for seconding American 
experts to the Afghan public administration. The other main sources for the national 
development budget were the EC (210 million), with lesser amounts from Japan, UK, the 
World Bank, and Canada.33 The IFIs were initially less important as a source of funding 
because of uncleared arrears with IDA, and because the transitional administration requested 
grant money rather than loans. The World Bank, for instance, had a very small project 
portfolio in Afghanistan (100 million during 2002-2003.). The Bank still played an important 
role as administrator of the principal trust fund (ARTF) and as advisor on policy reform.  
3.2. Relief versus Reconstruction 
 From the very beginning, both the type and amount of aid were a source of controversy 
between the Afghan administration and the donors. The government’s Afghan Assistance 
Coordination Authority (AACA) estimated that through March 2003, 54% of the aid money 
had been spent on humanitarian rather than rehabilitation and development programs, thereby 
prolonging dependence on external sources.34 There was some merit to the complaint. Much 
of the humanitarian aid was food distributed through the World Food Program (WFP), a 
standard US in-kind donation. Although four years of drought being replaced by good 
harvests in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, WFP continued to send in huge amounts of wheat. 
Wheat prices fell to an all-time low, undercutting efforts to revive local production. In some 
areas farmers reportedly did not even bother to harvest their crop. By late 2003, both farmers 
and ATA officials were complaining about the continuing WFP operation, noting that it 
might encourage cultivation of other crops, especially poppy. 
 
Other activities were much more appropriate. UNICEF's ‘back to school’ program was 
frequently cited by Afghan authorities, donors and UNAMA as a major, early 
accomplishment. The same applied to UNICEF's immunization program and UNHCR 
support for the return of an estimated 1.8 million refugees. There was widespread agreement 
that these were priority areas of post-war reconstruction. Aid to returning refugees remained a 
priority in the planning for the first national program during the fall of 2002, representing 
almost 20% of the total indicative budget.35 With the exception of the WFP food aid, the 
discussion of relief versus development seemed to be a proxy debate; in reality the issue was 
not so much the type or purpose of the assistance, but who should control it. 
 
There was remarkably little debate over the alleged gap between relief and development that 
had featured centrally in the aid discourse for almost a decade.36 Some transitional programs 
that contained both relief and reconstruction aspects were started immediately, notably in 
health and education as noted above, as well as two national programs initiated by the 
transitional administration. The latter entailed the provision of block grants to local 
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communities under the National Solidarity Program (NSP), and labor- intensive projects 
under the National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP). Both NSP and NEEP received 
rapid funding from donors, including transfers from the World Bank’s special Post-Conflict 
Fund. Support to returning refugees and IDPs - a typical transitional problem area - was 
incorporated into programs with broader development goals. For instance, a high ratio of 
returnees was one criterion for selecting areas eligible for NSP grants.37  
 
Massive problems remained in the refugee and IDP sector.38 But the difficulties facing 
returnees in 2002-3 were not simply, or even primarily, due to a lack of transitional 
mechanisms or funding, but reflected the enormity and complexity of the problem, including 
lack of protection (for returning Pashtuns in the North), general insecurity, landmines and 
unexploded ordnance, property disputes and unemployment. 
3.3. Priorities of Reconstruction 
Assisted by international experts, the transitional administration produced a National 
Development Framework (NDF) and a National Development Budget (NDB) in record time. 
A draft NDF was ready in April 2002, a few months after the interim authority had been 
established, and an indicative NDB had been discussed with donors by the end of the year. 
Both laid out priorities for reconstruction that helped shape donor contributions. The 
coordination structure established first by the UN (Program Secretariats), and reshaped by the 
Ministry of Finance with a CG label, likewise created some order in an otherwise incoherent 
aid process. With multiple players and often conflicting interests, such harmonization 
mechanisms were essential.  
 
The twelve priority areas regrouped under three pillars by the NDF and the NDB were a 
comprehensive list of development needs rather than an identification of priorities. Donors 
and NGOs were asked to sign up for three or four sectors covered by the corresponding group 
in the co-ordination structure (sixteen sectoral groups and five advisory groups for cross-
cutting issues). The structure was designed to help match the needs identified by the Afghan 
ministries with the interests of the aid organizations. In practice, the coordination mechanism 
performed unevenly, with some groups being more structured and efficient than others, partly 
depending upon the chairmanship.39 More important was the overall dynamic of supply and 
demand. The donors initially dominated program identification and project selection. By mid-
2003 the process had become less supply-driven as the Ministry of Finance established 
greater control, partly by imposing greater discipline on the demand side through an 
established budget process, and by insisting on complete information from aid organizations 
on the total inflow of aid.  
 
By late 2003 a coherent set of long-term priorities had emerged in the form of development 
budget projections for three fiscal years (2003-2005).40 Here, Pillar 1 - Human and Social 
Capital - still takes a major part of the budget (from 50% in the preceding budget, down to 
43%). There is a significant internal reallocation: aid to refugee return is almost phased out, 
the health sector remains at the same level, whereas allocations for education and rural 
livelihoods are more than doubled. The size of Pillar 2 - Physical Infrastructure - is increased 
from 32% to 54% of the total, mainly due to a huge increase in the transportation sector. For 
technical budgetary reasons, Pillar 3 - Rule of Law and Security - does not include major 
items such as support to the new Afghan army, mine action, and counter-narcotics, and has 
shrunk from about 10% in the first budget projection to only a couple of percentage points of 
the total in the last projection.  
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The priorities implicit in the activities undertaken during the first two years (2002-2003) had 
more of a patchwork quality. Five areas stand out, apart from continuing relief-type 
operations: 
 
· building core state capacity: creating high- level decision-making capacity by putting in 
place a core group of public servants, supported by international advisors while 
recognizing long delays in the planned  broad-based civil service reform; establishing a 
budgetary process and identifiable payroll registers for the public service 
·  financial and trade reform: currency reform, banking and investment laws (completed in 
late 2002); trade and customs rate simplification (initiated in 2003) 
· revitalizing the educational sector: providing schoolbooks, refurbishing schools and 
reopening schools for girls 
· national programs to provide equity and ‘solidarit’': the NSP (block grants to 
communities) and the NEEP (labor- intensive emergency-oriented projects).  
· transportation/communications: restoration of national trunk road system is delayed, but 
major parts are completed in late 2003; repair of secondary and feeder roads (NEEP 
projects, priority area for USAID, and in part as WFP Food-for-Work projects). 
 
The rationale for the first item - creating central state capacity - has been discussed in the 
previous chapter 2. Financial and trade reforms were necessary to give the state a basic 
economic infrastructure in lieu of informal banking and currency transactions, multiple 
issuing of currency and diverse systems of customs collection that were inherited from the 
past. The importance of secular education, especially for females, was self-evident in view of 
the Taliban’s neglect or denial of this area. The national programs (NSP and NEEP) were 
designed, it seems, primarily to signal that the administration’s commitment  to rapidly 
distribute peace dividends, and to do so in an equitable manner. In economic terms, both NSP 
and NEEP were initially quite small. By late 2003, two years after the interim authority was 
formed, NEEP had generated a total of 2.3 million labor days. That was equivalent to about 
one-third of a day’s work per member of the labor force if the latter is estimated at 8 million 
in a total popula tion of 23.5 million. 41 The NSP, as noted in chapter 2, had just started by end 
of 2003, with required Village Development Councils elected in only one-fourth of the 
villages selected for the initial phase of the program.  
 
As for communications, Afghanistan’s important transit trade and the significance of a good 
road net for national integration made restoration of the main arteries an early reconstruction 
priority. If based on labor intensive schemes, road construction could also provide local 
employment opportunities of the kind often identified as important for stabilizing an 
immediate post-war situation. 42 Initial plans and a division of labor were discussed with the 
major donors (EC, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the US and Iran) and the ADB, but except for parts 
of the northern route (the Salang tunnel) and the Iran-Herat stretch in the West, rehabilitation 
met with serious delays. In part, this was caused by the decision of the Kabul government to 
switch from discussions of loans (with the ADB) to requests for grant money from donors, 
which meant delays in project preparations. In the end, the US completed its promised 
portion in late 2003 - the Kabul-Kandahar stretch - but used on a capital- intensive approach 
involving international contractors (a US main contractor, with Turkish and Indian sub-
contractors).  
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3.4. Principles of Reconstruction 
Despite an apparently patchy quality, the early reconstructions activities are coherent in terms 
of underlying principles of policy. Most obvious is the centrality of the private sector as the 
engine of growth. Large-scale public works to generate employment through reconstruction 
were clearly not consistent with this policy perspective. Rather, promoting policy reforms and 
establishing a regulatory capacity to stimulate the market constituted logical first steps. 
Slightly down the line, the infusion of massive funds for infrastructural development would 
follow, and the emphasis on grant rather than loan money made it possible to escape the debt 
trap. Poverty reduction was to be realized mainly through the creation of wealth and an 
‘affordable social policy’.43 The state was to be a regulator rather than an implementer of 
policy. Moreover, as the Ministry of Finance repeatedly emphasized, the state would follow 
‘responsible’ policies by not running budget deficits or resorting to monetary financing of the 
budget.  
 
These principles were consistently and coherently articulated by the Minister of Finance. 
Ashraf Ghani expressed a clear vision of the country's reconstruction and development 
policy, and played an extraordinarily important role in its formulation. In an unusual move, 
some core economic principles were also incorporated in the constitution – including the 
importance of a market economy and a balanced budget. The Minister was of course not 
alone. The entire ATA operated in an international political context that favored market 
forces, open economies, and a lean state. Since the end of the Cold War, these principles had 
formed the framework for economic reconstruction in all 'post-conflict' situations receiving 
large international aid flows. What distinguished the Afghan case was the radical and 
coherent form that characterized economic policy from the very beginning. The explanation 
seems to lie in the ideological coherence between a few influential individuals on the 
government side (the Minister of Finance was an Afghan-American who had previously 
worked with the World Bank, and some of his advisors were recruited through the Adam 
Smith Institute in London) and two institutional aid actors that happened to be critically 
important at the time (the US government and the World Bank).  
 
In line with the market approach, contracts for projects and services were to be awarded 
through competitive bidding by firms, NGOs and, the Minister of Finance proposed, the UN 
humanitarian agencies as well. The principles were partly tested out on the NSP (as discussed 
in chapter 2) and guided the planned reform of the public health sector. The reforms were 
modeled on a World Bank supported program in Cambodia, with USAID taking a lead role in 
the planning. Early assessments suggested that privatized delivery of health services might 
not be suitable in view of Afghanistan’s geographic diversity and difficult access to some 
areas.44 Critics warned that the reform would leave poor and remote villages even worse off 
than at present. A related issue that indicated problems ahead was the reluctance of 
international private companies executing current USAID-funded projects in the health sector 
to share information with the Ministry of Health. 
 
A minimal, regulatory, state is probably preferable if the only alternative is a weak and 
corrupt state. Yet, even a regulatory state has to ensure certain basic conditions for 
reconstruction to proceed. It needs to provide sufficient security for the market to function, 
and it must prevent the most backward areas from falling out in the bidding process on 
reconstruction projects and social services. It is not clear that these conditions can be met in 
Afghanistan at present. 
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Regional inequities in Afghanistan are sharp, not only on a city-village scale but also among 
provinces. The ratio of doctors to inhabitants in Kabul (1:1000) as compared wiith the remote 
province of Ghor (1:500 000) is emblematic of inequities within and among provinces.45 
Although there is no reliable national data on the geographic distribution of aid and 
rehabilitation projects, it is a commonly agreed that assistance is unevenly distributed.46 
Certainly, the large presence of UN agencies and NGOs in major cities leads people to 
believe that these areas are benefiting more than the rural areas. From the perspective of 
NGOs or international agencies bidding for government projects, there are obvious 
advantages to work in easily accessible areas, where they are visible, and where a modicum 
of infrastructure makes it easier to achieve results. A major concern in Afghanistan at present 
is insecurity, which is increasingly reducing the ability of aid agencies to operate in the 
southern and eastern provinces. 
 
Against this background, reconstruction policies that are promoting uneven development, 
even if only in the short term, are particularly problematic. Afghanistan’s situation of 
‘conflictual peacebuilding’ suggests that aid must have a short-term dimension where the 
critical objectives are to promote consensus and compromise by demonstrating equity in the 
distribution of goods. Areas where insecurity and backwardness combine to create spiraling 
dissatisfaction would require special attention. The alternative could be the emergence of 
‘rogue provinces’, and an increasingly divided country between a turbulent South and East, 
on the one hand, and a more stable crescent stretching from the West to the North where 
rehabilitation and development can move forward. 
  
The overall reconstruction policy chartered by the ATA and the aid agencies reflects a 
willingness to accept enormous dependence on foreign funding. Budget estimates in the 
recent ATA/aid agencies report, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, project a 1:8 ratio of 
domestic revenues to external funds over the next 7-year period. The Minister of Finance has 
requested 28.5 billion dollars in fresh aid money for the same period to generate an 
irreversible growth spurt. The request may be unrealistic; by comparison the international 
community pledged 4.5 billion for the first 5-year period after Taliban. That was at a time 
when Afghanistan was at the forefront of international attention. 
 
The heavy reliance on official aid transfers represents in effect a ‘hidden state’ in the 
development strategy. Practicing ’no deficit financing’ is easy as long as donor governments 
continue to provide fresh funds. On the other hand, introducing requests for large amounts of 
foreign funding into the policy discussion has some little noted but important side effects. It 
tends to raise popular Afghan expectations of rapid growth and recovery to an unrealistic 
level. While the international community can be blamed if progress and funding are slow (as 
is now happening), the result may also be negative attitudes among Afghans towards both the 
government and the foreign agencies. 
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Reconstruction in Practice 
 
· Kabul has the looks of a boom town with attendant large-scale poverty and squalor. There is 
rebuilding on a large scale and streets with shops selling building equipment are congested with 
traffic. The foreign presence has visibly increased in step with the inflow of aid money. The 
bustling activity has attracted numerous internal migrants and returning refugees, who have 
decided go to the capital rather than their home areas. Over one-third of Kabul’s population is 
estimated to be returning refugees and IDPs. The population of Kabul province has grown to 
2.8 million as compared to 1.78 million in 1999.1 Real estate prices in the best areas of the city 
approach those of downtown New York, but a few blocks away there is squalor. Trading and 
movement of people has visibly increased over the past year. Five airlines now serve Kabul 
International airport, while the national airline, Ariana, flies regularly to the provinces and is 
heavily booked. 
 
· In Herat the international presence is less evident. The number of NGOs and UN staff has only 
increased slightly compared to the Taliban period, the diplomatic community remains limited, 
and there is a small contingent of US soldiers (PRT). With general public security, although not 
necessarily individual security, trade has visibly revived. Large numbers of trucks are arriving 
from Iran and Turkmenistan, and traders are investing in new buildings in the city. The 
governor, Ismail Khan, has spent some of his very considerable custom duties to refurbish 
Iranian style parks and recreation areas. Signboards along the major roads with paintings of 
‘shahids’ – the men killed in the fighting against the Russians – help keep the jihadi spirit alive 
as a foundation for political power. The Pakistani consulate, which was very active during the 
Taliban regime, remains closed, but there is a long visa queue outside the Iranian consulate, as 
well as a newly opened Indian consulate.  
 
· In the Pashtun heartland in the South and Southeast the situation is very different. The 
number of NGOs in Ghazni and Wardak has declined, partly due to security concerns. Afghan 
staff are targeted and accused of being ‘agents of foreign powers’, whether they work for 
international or national NGOs. Schools are burnt down, just as as they were during the Soviet 
period in the 1980s. The Coalition forces patrol the roads and attack-helicopters hover 
over the Kabul-Kandahar road. The road is also patrolled by the local police, although 
irregularly. The local administration is virtually non-existent, and what is there is run 
by mujahedin commanders more used to develop battlefield strategies than 
rehabilitation plans. Agriculture still suffers from the after-effects of the long drought, 
and many men seek employment outside the area. Only a few refugees or IDPs have 
come back to their homes. The villagers watch the trucks heavily loaded with 
commercial goods that make their way to Pakistan, while trucks with relief assistance 
pass the other way towards Kabul and central Afghanistan. In some places, villagers 
struggle to collect enough money to meet the ransom that Generals Dostum and Atta 
demand for the release of their relatives who were taken prisoner while fighting for the 
Taliban. There is growing dissatisfaction with both local and national authorities, and a 
growing feeling that the Pashtun have fared badly in the so-called peace process, the 
benefits of which many have difficulty identifying. 
Snapshots from different locations in late 2003 illustrate the point: 
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3.5. Reassessing Needs and Costs 
The visible results of the reconstruction activities during the past two years have been 
relatively few and scattered, leading to a debate about the adequacy of funding. Several types 
of benchmark have been used.47 Comparison of disbursements with pledges is one. However, 
as one study points out, this standard only measures donor performance in honoring 
promises, and does not relate to needs or goals on the ground. Similarly, comparison of per 
capita aid money in Afghanistan with other 'post-conflict' situations (East Timor, Rwanda, 
Kosovo and Bosnia) does not reflect actual needs – which may vary considerably from one 
country to another – but measures international equity in post-war aid distribution. 48 The 
initial needs assessment prepared for the 2002 Tokyo pledging conference was derived from 
the specific conditions of Afghanistan, but lacked a  clear definition of ‘need’ and was done 
in an unsystematic manner.49  
 
While previously arguing for large funds on the grounds of international equity and promise 
keeping, the transitional administration has more recently shifted its ground. In preparation 
for the next budget and the international conference on Afghanistan scheduled for late March, 
the administration is linking its reconstruction objectives to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG).50 To translate these goals into budgetary figures and assess implications for 
aid, the MoF undertook a costing exercise with the support the World Bank, ADB, IMF, 
UNAMA and UNDP.51 
 
As the resulting report, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, shows, this is a politically compelling 
and technically doable exercise. The World Bank has elsewhere assessed the progress made 
by low-and middle- income countries towards the MDG. 52 The Swiss-based Global 
Governance Initiative of the prestigious World Economic Forum released a study in January 
2004 on the aid implications of the MDG, concluding that the international aid community 
has so far provided only one-fourth of the resources necessary to achieve the goals by 2015, 
as agreed to at the Millennium Summit.53 
 
At the same time, the MDG focus clearly transforms the discussion of aid to Afghanistan 
from the context of post-war reconstruction to that of development more generally. Several 
countries in Africa and South Asia are also far from reaching the MDG. 54 For donors, this 
raises some basic questions: 
 
Why prioritize Afghanistan over other countries that are also a long way from reaching the 
MDG? 
The Afghan administration has a ready answer: Unless the international community provides 
adequate assistance, Afghanistan will become a ‘narco-mafia state’. This notion is currently 
being advanced by administration officials. In its crude form the argument resembles 
blackmail; even its more sophisticated version misplaces the focus of attention, which surely 
should be on the possibilities for effectively meeting the most pressing needs of the Afghan 
people, rather than on counterfactual hypotheses about the sources and costs of a ‘narco-
mafia state’. 
 
Does Afghanistan have the absorptive capacity to effectively use the almost 30 billion dollars 
in aid which the administration is requesting for the next 7-year period? 
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The administration has a ready answer for this as well: Sufficient absorptive capacity can be 
imported in the short run. The pros and cons of this strategy have been discussed in chapter 2. 
3.4. Conclusions 
The move from relief to reconstruction has been slow, with few large-scale visible 
demonstrations of the benefits of peace. This is not merely a matter of shortage of funds, but 
reflects policy priorities and strategies.   
 
The overall Afghan reconstruction framework holds out a vision for long-term, private-sector 
driven growth that, even if it succeeds, is very likely to create highly uneven development in 
the short-run.  Implications are particularly negative in the context of ‘conflictual 
peacebuilding’, which typically requires inclusiveness and equity in the distribution of goods 
and services. Unless balanced by special countermeasures, a market approach to 
reconstruction may exacerbate current inequalities. Central in this respect is the role of the 
Pashtun areas in the South and Southeast. 
 
The 4-year drought that ended in 2002 affected the country unevenly. Among the provinces 
that suffered most were the Pashtun areas of the South and the Southeast that are now 
experiencing growing insecurity related to the war. These are also areas with considerable 
popular alienation from the transitional administration in Kabul. Combined, these factors may 
produce ‘rogue provinces’ that lie beyond the influence of the central government. This 
further raises prospect of a country divided between a violent and stagnant part, as against a 
stable region where development can take place. 
 
Greater influx of foreign funds by itself will not correct current and potential future 
imbalances. What matters is how available funds are being spent. The current request by the 
transitional administration for massive inflows to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a 
‘narco-mafia state’ does not address the critical, structural imbalance between regions or 
identify corrective measures. 
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4. POLITICAL TRANSITION  
The Bonn Agreement provided a detailed structure and function for an interim authority and 
set a clear timetable for the political transition to a “broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-
ethnic and fully representative government.”  Power would be transferred from the previous 
UN-recognized government (with Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani as 
president) to an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on the 22 December 2001. Within six 
months an Emergency loya jirga would be held to “decide on a Transitional Authority.” 
Within 18 months of its establishment, the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) would 
convene a Constitutional loya jirga to adopt a new constitution. General elections to a “fully 
representative government” to replace the transitional authority would be held “no later than 
two years” after the Emergency loya jirga. The agreement further established a number of 
commissions that would be part of the political process - an Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, an Independent Civil Service Commission, a Judicial Commission, a 
Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency loya jirga, and a 
Constitutional Commission. 
 
With some exceptions, the process moved like clockwork. The Emergency loya jirga took 
place on time in mid-June 2002, the Transitional Authority was established, a constitution 
was drafted and a Constitutional loya jirga convened in mid-December 2003, only a month 
behind schedule. Most of the required commissions  were formed (although not all were 
equally operational). By late 2004 preparations for general elections were underway, 
although it was highly doubtful they would be completed by June 2004 as required in the 
agreement. Keeping to the timetable laid out in Bonn was rightly considered an achievement, 
although the way the transition unfolded was probably more important. 
4.1. The Transitional Cabinets 
The Bonn Agreement specified the composition of the interim authority, and most of the 
cabinet members had participated in the conference. The main achievement of the short- lived 
AIA was to establish an internationally accepted Afghan government, the prescribed 
commissions and to ensure that the Emergency loya jirga took place on time. The political 
infrastructure for the subsequent Transitional Authority was laid down, and Chairman Hamid 
Karzai emerged as a central figure. Karzai was a domestically unifying force and an 
internationally respected face for the interim authority. Yet he had returned from exile as the  
candidate favored by the United States, and his dependence on Washington - symbolized by 
his American bodyguards - created legitimacy problems from the beginning. The other key 
positions in the AIA were controlled by a small faction of the Northern Alliance, which had 
also come to power due to the American military intervention - the Shura-e Nezar troika of 
Mohammed Qassem Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah and Yunus Qanooni, heading the 
Departments of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior, respectively. With some notable 
exceptions, the ministers in the AIA were chosen due to their role in the war against the 
Taliban. The critical task in the transition period was to establish a broader base of 
legitimacy. 
 
The prominence of the Minister of Defense - whose troops had entered Kabul without waiting 
for US approval in the last phase of the war - also meant that the Bonn provision specifying 
the withdrawal of Afghan military units and heavy weapons from the capital was not 
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implemented.55 While the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) made a significant 
contribution to creating a neutral political space in Kabul, it nevertheless operated within 
constraints set by the Minister of Defense. This point was underscored when ISAF was 
sidelined in a critical dispute during the Emergency loya jirga, demonstrating that Kabul was 
not, after all, an entirely neutral ground (see 4.2 below). 
  
While the Interim Authority had some Pashtun faces - most prominently Chairman Karzai, 
Finance Minister Ghani, and until his assassination in July 2002, Interior Minister Haji Qadir 
- the locus of power was clearly the Shura-e Nezar. The shura (council) was established by 
the late Ahmad Shah Masood and remained dominated by Tajik commanders from the 
Pansjir Valley. This situation created a strong sense of marginalization among the Pashtuns – 
who were the traditional rulers and Afghanistan’s single largest ethnic group. The uneven 
power structure was maintained in the subsequent transitional authority and deepened the 
legitimacy problem.  
 
The uneasy relationship between Pashtuns and the government was also reflected in the 
debate about the respective roles of the former King Zahir Shah, his family and followers. In 
exile since 1973, Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan in April 2002, and agreed to open the 
Emergency loya jirga. The King enjoyed relatively broad support among the otherwise 
deeply divided Pashtun groups, and was acceptable to many people in other ethnic groups as 
well. While the Islamist-oriented mujahedin groups opposed the King for having distanced 
himself from the jihad against the communists, many Afghans who remembered the 
subsequent devastating civil war among the mujahedin parties supported the King for that 
very reason. To counter his appeal in the early transitional phase, the Shura-e Nezar used 
every opportunity to diminish his influence; for example, by not permitting his return to 
Kabul to be broadcast on national television. 
4.2. The Emergency Loya Jirga 
The Emergency loya jirga that took place in Kabul from 15 to 22 June 2002 was the first 
milestone in the political transition process. The interim administration selected in Bonn was 
to be replaced by one mandated by a traditional Afghan grand council, thereby placing the 
next phase of the transition on more legitimate ground. In retrospect, the Emergency loya 
jirga was important in defining the rules of politics that emerged in the post-Taliban era, and 
is should be considered in some detail. 
 
It was feared from the start that the loya jirga process would be hijacked by existing power 
holders - including former commanders elevated to positions in the transitional authority, and 
powerful local commanders. Both the process of selecting delegates (indirect on the district 
level) and the proceedings of the council meeting were open to abuse. Concern regarding this 
matter grew as a range of procedural safeguards, that had been established for the Emergency 
loya jirga by the Commission and UNAMA to limit the influence of the military 
commanders, were bypassed. The Commission had set these criteria for selection: The 
delegates should not have a record of drug production, abuse of human rights, war crimes, 
looting of public property or smuggling of items of cultural and archaeological heritage. 
More generally, “[i]n the eyes of the people, [they must] not have been involved indirectly or 
directly in the killing of innocent people.” 56 While not many commanders were elected to the 
council, they often succeeded in controlling the selection of the delegates from their districts 
by using threats and bribery. 57 Moreover, when some former commanders were blocked from 
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being elected, the number of delegates was increased and a range of warlords and self-
appointed governors ended up in the quota of delegates appointed by Chairman Karzai.  
 
The Commission further tried to ensure that the secret service (the Amniat-e Melli, under the 
direct control of Defense Minister Fahim) was not allowed into the loya jirga during the 
proceedings. While UNAMA had participated in establishing these rules, the head of the 
mission (the SRSG) backed down when confronted by demands from the secret service to 
enter. The SRSG evidently feared that Fahim might make good on his veiled threats to shell 
the loya jirga meeting; the inclination of both the SRSG’s own senior staff members and the 
British commander of the ISAF forces in Kabul, however, was to stand firm. The ISAF 
commander concluded that his force of 5,000 men could serve as a deterrent even if not 
backed up by US-led Coalition forces operating outside Kabul. US military power had on 
other occasions been used in tacit communication to discipline unruly warlords in the North 
and the East, even though the mission of US forces was to crush enemy units, not to influence 
the political process. In this instance, however, US power was not brought to bear on the 
dispute.   
 
The results were predictable. In the first days of the council meeting, Afghans freely 
expressed their views, with many condemning warlords and jihadis. Women were 
particularly active. Intimidation subsequently made delegates much more cautious. Several 
were advised to keep quiet, receiving messages such as “your family will receive a package 
with you cut up in small pieces”. 58  
 
Ambiguity surrounding the proceedings and the mandate of the assembly constituted another 
problem. It was made clear from the start that the delegates would elect a president. The US 
envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, at this point intervened blatantly to neutralise the monarchists by 
calling a press conference where he announced that Zahir Shah was not a candidate. This 
effectively muted the most serious opposition to Karzai’s election.  The remaining 
appointment process was equally manipulated. The Bonn Agreement had mandated the 
Emergency loya jirga to “decide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based 
transitional administration.” Given the mood of the assembly, an open election process 
probably would have excluded all former warlords from the successor administration, 
creating further concern by the US and the UN that these warlords would become ‘spoilers’ 
in the peace process. Thus, the assembly was not invited to decide on the composition of the 
Transitional Administration.  President Karzai merely presented a list with the names of some 
ministers, but the assembly was not called upon to vote on it, propose changes, or formally 
authorize Karzai to select his cabinet. Karzai himself was elected in a secret ballot by a large 
majority, but there were no other serious candidates seeking election. 
 
Having the Emergency loya jirga elect an advisory council to serve alongside the transitional 
administration had also been discussed in Bonn and was certainly possible within the 
framework of the Agreement. When the loya jirga met, however, this option was strongly 
opposed by the SRSG and the US for fear that it would open up a more uncontrollable 
process. The SRSG, in particular, was concerned that Islamist groupings would exploit such a 
forum. While the Islamists included some of the mujahedin parties that previously had been 
allies of the West (Sayaff and Rabbani), these groupings were now recognized as profoundly 
undemocratic and potential spoilers in the Western-supported peacebuilding process. To 
contain these forces, the SRSG and the US advised against the formation of an advisory 
council at that time, and there the matter rested.  
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As a result, the Emergency loya jirga left a mixed legacy. It was praised internationally and 
approved by many Afghans as a first step towards democracy that simultaneously preserved 
political stability. Given the nature of the proceedings, however, the assembly did not 
significantly enhance the legitimacy of the transitional cabinet, which arguably was its main 
task. Instead, the ability of existing power holders and the US to manipulate the process with 
the acquiescence of the UN created some additional problems of legitimacy and served to 
discredit the democratic model more generally. The unwillingness of the US and the UN to 
face down the warlords on matters of clear procedural violations showed that the two most 
important international actors in the process chose accommodation with local strongmen over 
democratic values. The events also revealed that when faced with the familiar problem of 
how to handle undemocratic forces within a Western democratic system, the US and the UN 
responded by favoring controls and exclusion.  
 
The Emergency loya jirga process created disillusionment among Afghans who took 
seriously the objectives of the Bonn Agreement and the standards of customary democratic 
procedures. The potentially strongest constituency for a modern, westernized political 
development agenda was noticeably angered. Outside Kabul there was criticism as well, and 
predictably so in the Pashtun heartland. A group of loya jirga delegates interviewed in 
Wardak and Ghazni 2002 agreed with one speaker who said, “Karzai was the loudspeaker 
and Brahimi was the wire that connected him to the Americans.”59  
 
Importantly, the Emergency loya jirga was a political primer that affected preparations for 
subsequent transition events - the constitutional assembly and the general elections. Some 
Afghans concluded that the power holders would manipulate these events as well, and scaled 
back their expectations of democratic development.  Others – including delegates from 
Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif - started to organize so as to improve their skills for the next 
fights in the political arena.  
4.3. The Constitutional Process 
Not surprisingly, the process of drafting a new constitution became a major political struggle 
among different Afghan factions. The US envoy, appointed US ambassador by mid-2003, 
and Brahimi on the UN side, participated actively as well, jointly seeking to promote the 
modernist and Karzai- led factions of the transitional administration.  
 
To control the drafting process, Karzai and his supporters used procedural techniques that 
were strongly criticized by civic rights groups.60 The draft constitution was only made public 
on November 3, about a month before the constitutional assembly was to open. This allowed 
very little time for informed consultation by the public or for delegates to prepare themselves. 
With UNAMA’s assistance, public hearings were conducted with a sample of focus groups 
throughout the country before the draft was published. While superficial, the hearings helped 
educate people about their civic rights and allowed the participants to express their general 
preferences by filling in questionnaires distributed by the Commission Secretariat. Some 
178,000 persons participated, according to UNAMA. Regional disparities in participation 
were marked: consultations were most extensive in the North, with much more limited 
participation in the Pashtun heartland in the South and Southeast.61 
 
The process reflected conflicting views in the Commission, the ATA and the UN community. 
The spirit of the Bonn Agreement and frequently declared affirmations of democratic norms 
implied a commitment to open and genuine constitutional consultations. Afghan and 
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international NGOs strongly lined up in favor of this approach. On the other hand, fears 
remained that the Islamists groups might hijack a more open process, particularly when it 
came to questions about the relationship between the state and religion. Some Afghans 
argued additionally that the common man (let alone woman) had little to contribute to the 
constitutional process. 
 
A sharp divergence between the penultimate and final drafts was emblematic of the nature of 
the process. Efforts by the Karzai faction to control the drafting process in the Commission 
had apparently failed. According to the International Crisis Group, which had access to the 
penultimate draft, the Constitutional Review Commission had opted for a system of 
considerable checks-and-balances.62 In particular, the power of the president would be curbed 
by a prime minister and a strong parliament, and a constitutional court would be a check on 
the Supreme Court (which at the time was dominated by clerics).63 When the final draft was 
made public two months later, it became apparent that it had been dramatically revised. This 
draft had a strong presidential system, with no prime minister, no constitutional court, and a 
weak parliament.  
 
The revisions were undertaken in the office of Karzai and his National Security Council in a 
process that was not prescribed by the Bonn Agreement. It is widely believed that the key 
actors behind the change were ambassador Khalilzad and Brahimi, as well as Karzai and his 
modernist supporters in the government. All were known to favor an institutionally strong 
president that could provide control and stability, and (presuming Karzai or an equivalent 
figure would hold the presidency) maintain a pro-Western, modernist direction.  
 
The imprint of Karzai and his supporters was evident elsewhere in the revised document as 
well. The final draft followed the approach that had been adopted in principle after the Bonn 
meeting, by affirming that the state administration would be highly centralized. Provincial 
administration, including governors, would be under the control of the line ministries and the 
government in Kabul. Provincial- level assemblies were instituted primarily for the purpose of 
advising the Kabul-appointed administration, while elected district and village councils 
would serve the same purpose. The draft was a legal frontal attack on the power of the 
warlords and various self-styled governors in the provinces. The clauses governing political 
parties (which paralleled the previously promulgated law on political parties) were inspired 
by secular modernism. Political parties could not be established along ethnic, religious or 
regional differences (and the president was by law not allowed to act on such considerations). 
Political parties with links to military or paramilitary groups were prohibited. The provisions 
formally disenfranchised all the mujahedin-based parties that were poised to claim power in 
the post-Taliban period.  
 
The draft constitution differed so fundamentally from political realities that it raised serious 
questions about its relevance altogether. The document outlined a strong central state, a 
strong presidency, demilitarized political parties and the absence of ethnicity and religion in 
political life. The realities of Afghanistan showed a skeletal central state, a weak president, 
militarized politics and political allegiance divided along religious and ethnic lines.   
 
As the Constitutional loya jirga convened, fierce struggles developed on three main fronts. 
One concerned Islam versus secular modernism. The role of Islam had been kept under wraps 
in the drafting process and emerged as a bland principle specifying that no law should be 
contrary to Islam. Few could disagree. Another key issue was the balance of power between 
the president and the parliament. The third front concerned the balance among the ethnic 
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groups, with Pashtun dissatisfaction with the dominance of the Pansjiris rapidly being 
matched by fears among the minorities of renewed Pasthun dominance. 
 
Uneasy alignments were formed. Those supporting a strong presidency had to compromise 
with Pashtun mujahedin factions who supported Karzai because he might end the 
marginalization of the Pashtun people, but – unlike the modernists - they wanted a stronger 
affirmation of Islam in the constitution. On the other side was a curious mix of groups that 
held very different views on the nature of society and politics, but agreed on the need for a 
prime minister and a stronger parliament to curb the power of the president. This grouping 
included Pansjiri Northern Alliance leaders who hoped that a dispersion of power would help 
to safeguard their present positions, NGOs which wanted checks-and-balances as a guarantee 
of pluralist democracy, and minorities who feared that a strong presidency would mean 
Pashtun rule. This grouping represented starkly opposing views on the role of Islam, on 
human rights and on the role of women in society. 
 
In the end, a modified version of the final draft was approved. Presidential power remained 
strong, but the parliament was given a greater role (particularly in approving presidential 
appointments). The language was modified to strengthen the role of Islam and to 
acknowledge that women were bearers of rights. Some concessions were made on the 
language rights of minorities (an issue pressed by the Uzbek delegates). Overall, the 
constitution represented a considerable victory for the centrist approach and for secular 
modernism. It also demonstrated that despite the genuine parliamentary aspects of the process 
- the debating, lobbying, bargaining and forming of coalitions among the Afghan delegates - 
the process unfolded in the shadow of US power. As if to underline the point, the American 
ambassador was actively ‘working the floor’ during the proceedings.      
 
As during the Emergency loya jirga, serious, and in some areas widespread, intimidation 
occurred during the selection of representatives. The flawed process was reflected in the 
composition of the delegates. The main mujahedin parties that were connected to military 
factions and their commanders accounted for almost 70 percent of the 344 elected delegates, 
according to some estimates.64 Virtually all of the delegates from Herat were closely tied to 
the powerful governor of that province, Ismail Khan, despite significant opposition in the 
run-up to the elections. The newer reformist and democratic forces were few and fragmented. 
In this situation, the military groups and related political parties found that instead of openly 
violating the rules (as during the previous loya jirga), they could use the parliamentary 
procedures to their advantage. Thus, the mujahedin parties not only secured the chairmanship 
of the assembly (Sigbatullah Mojadeddi), but also the chairmanship of more than half of the 
committees. 
 
To hail the constitution as the outcome of a truly democratic process would be an 
exaggeration. Yet it was a sign of democratic maturity that deeply divisive issues in a society 
newly emerged from repeated civil wars were actually slugged out in the political arena. The 
test of relevance remains. The constitution may be observed, ignored, or violated. For 
instance, factions around the Defense Minister were in October 2003 rumored to be planning 
a coup d’état, and may consider that option again if pressured. In addition to his local forces, 
the Defense Minister has been reported to be receiving covert aid from Russia, thus balancing 
the Karzai-US axis. Despite this undertone of internationally supported internal competition, 
the constitution is an added tool in the legal web of constraint that the international 
community collectively has been promoting as a critical tool of peacebuilding in Afghanistan.  
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The shortcomings of the process - particularly when viewed against the rhetoric of 
democratic principles - are obvious. The constitution is certain to be viewed by many as 
another US-UN influenced exercise in affirming the power of their preferred candidate. The 
limited involvement of the general public underlined the lack of countervailing political 
power to check the role of the commanders and the exiles that returned with foreign support. 
4.4. Elections 
By late 2003 there was serious discussion in the international community and the ATA about 
whether to hold a Bonn II meeting to escape from the strictures of Bonn I regarding the 
timetable for elections. The wisdom of inserting a precise date in the Agreement was 
questioned. It had been argued in Bonn that a fixed date was a guarantee that elections would 
in fact be held. Moreover, it was hoped that by mid- 2004 – which lay more than two years in 
the future - demobilization would have advanced sufficiently to permit a meaningful election. 
A reasonably early election was also part of what had become the standard UN package for 
post-conflict operations.  
 
By early 2004, the proponents of flexibility seemed to have gained ground. UNAMA, which 
was to supervise voter registration as well as the elections, reported administrative delays, 
shortage of funds, and security concerns. It was improbable that registration could be 
completed on time even in relatively secure parts of the country. At the same time, increasing 
attacks on Afghan aid workers and international civilian personnel in the second half of 2003 
had de facto placed large parts of the South and Southeast off limits to foreign personnel, 
making a foreign-supervised registration and election process in these areas doubtful. Slow 
progress in demobilization reinforced the point.   
 
Whether to hold a presidential election alone, or to link it to parliamentary elections, was also 
up for discussion. The Bonn Agreement permitted either option, while the new constitution 
required that ‘every effort’ be made to hold the first round of parliamentary and presidential 
elections at the same time. Consonant with its preference for a strong presidency, the US took 
the position that presidential elections should be held around June 2004. By late January 
2004, William Taylor, the State Department’s coordinator for Afghanistan, admitted to the 
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the June election deadline might not be met due 
to security concerns, though a presidential election only might be feasible.65 This was also the 
position of SRSG Brahimi, as by late January only 0.6 million voters had registered 
themselves out of an expected 10.5 million. 66 Washington pointedly authorized an additional 
1.2 billion dollars in reconstruction aid to be spent in 2004, openly identifying the funds as 
support for the central administration and Karzai’s candidacy. 67 Those arguing for inclusive 
politics and checks on presidential power, including some EU members, favored holding 
presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously if elections were to be held at all. The 
prominent Kabul-based think-tank, AREU, argued cogently for postponing the elections 
altogether.68 In addition to logistical and security concerns, it was anticipated that elections - 
above all for president - would follow the earlier pattern of the political transition by mainly 
serving to legitimize the existing power holders. It would also be expensive - UNAMA was 
approaching donors with funding requirements of 78.2 million dollars.69 
 
The present condition of political parties in Afghanistan limits the democratic meaning of 
elections if they are held in the very near future. The principal political parties today have 
roots in the jihad period, when they were formed in exile in Pakistan and Iran. 70  Historically 
these mujahedin parties have had a predominantly military orientation, an authoritarian 
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internal organization centered on a strong leader, have been influenced and funded from 
abroad, and have developed a long record of misuse of power and abuse of human rights. The 
parties are now positioning themselves to contest for power in the political arena.  
 
Other political parties with reformist-democratic, ethnic-nationalist or leftist orientations (the 
latter including cadres from the former Maoist and Soviet communist parties) started to form 
in the post-Taliban period but were reluctant to go public until the role of political parties was 
clarified by law ( the decree of 11 September 2003 and  the new constitution).71 The poor 
showing of persons associated with the new groupings, or seen as independent in the 
elections to the constitutional assembly, is indicative of their weaknesses. This also reflects a 
more fundamental condition: Because of the recent history of communist and mujahedin 
parties, many Afghans view political parties as tools for oppression and as sources of 
violence, rather than as instruments of peaceful competition. 
4.5. Conclusions 
The constitutional delegates that assembled two years after the Bonn Agreement showed that 
that the political-military groupings were willing to contest their positions in a political arena. 
This was a major achievement in a society that had just emerged from repeated wars and was 
still enveloped in a culture of violence. Use of the traditional loya jirga institution greatly 
helped the process along; so did close and sustained international attention to see the 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement. The international community collectively left little 
doubt that the Afghan parties had to ‘play by the rules’ if they were to receive continued 
international aid, support and recognition.  
 
Problems remained. The intention of the transitional mechanism laid out in Bonn was to 
create an effective interim administration while simultaneously subjecting it to a 
democratizing process that in theory, at least, could put it out of business. By early 2004, the 
transitional dynamic had largely affirmed the position of the key power holders on both the 
national and local levels. Democratic processes on both levels were manipulated in favor of 
those with money, guns, or significant international support. Given the obvious limitations of 
legal- formal mechanisms for generating legitimacy, some observers called for the scheduled 
elections to be postponed while making more use of traditional means of establishing 
legitimacy through power-sharing and contractual compromises.  
 
If Western formal- legal instruments are to remain central, emphasis on substance over form 
will make them more meaningful. In this perspective it would make sense to postpone 
elections - estimated to cost almost 80 million dollars – while improving the underlying 
conditions that affect empowerment. These include not only physical security in the South 
and Southeast, but also greater efforts to create a rule of law, observe human rights and 
facilitate new political associations.  
 
On the other hand, Western-style elections have been so firmly established in international 
peacebuilding practice over the past decade that it would be difficult to postpone them for 
long. If presidential elections are held first, considerations of power sharing suggest that 
parliamentary elections follow as soon as possible, as the new constitution mandates. This is 
particularly important given the conflictual dimension of peacebuilding in Afghanistan.   
 
Neither the Bonn Agreement nor the new constitution provides particularly useful scripts for 
promoting inclusive politics in divided societies, nor for societies remaining in a situation of 
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low-intensity armed conflict. The promulgation of an entirely new constitution, as Bonn 
called for, brought out deeply divisive issues. To manage this process within a very tight 
timeline, the reformist-modernist faction of the transitional administration, strongly supported 
by the US and the UN mission, imposed controls that conflicted with the democratic ideals 
entailed in the declared policy and lofty goals of Bonn. The constitution itself, based on a 
strong presidency and a centrist approach, established a framework for dealing with diversity 
and conflict by means of winner-take-all strategies rather than inclusive power-sharing 
mechanisms. Under the best of circumstances, the result might be a military regime of the 
kind that repeatedly has ruled in neighboring Pakistan. 
 
By early 2004 the political transition had all the marks of being pulled in many different 
directions. The lofty goals of the Bonn Agreement acknowledged the right of the Afghans to 
“freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, 
democracy, pluralism and social justice. The Western international community was initially 
most concerned with promoting a stable government, and subsequently a modernist, pro-
Western government, even if this trampled on democratic niceties and on the principles of 
Islam as conservatively interpreted. The Afghans themselves disagreed on both goals and 
modalities. In this situation, the challenge of keeping the contest in the political arena remains 
formidable.  
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5. RULE OF LAW 
The importance of the rule of law has long been recognized as essential not only for the 
development of democracy, but more fundamentally for placing the state on a legal and moral 
foundation. Studies of peacebuilding further stress the importance of starting immediately to 
build the rule of law, although noting that this is often neglected in practice even when 
security conditions are favorable, as in East Timor and Kosovo.72 Given Afghanistan’s recent 
history, establishing the rule of law will be a long and difficult process. Precisely for that 
reason, state-building efforts arguably should be anchored early on in a firm commitment to 
law, above all at the central level.  
 5.1. Rule of Law and the State 
While defined in different ways, ‘rule of law’ means fundamentally the establishment of a 
rules-based administration as the basis for government. Most importantly, it means that the 
state and its agents are not above the law.  
 
The behavior of state actors is particularly important at the nationa l level insofar as the 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan seek to strengthen the central state.  By late 2003, the 
relationship between the law and the state showed a mixed picture. Two murders of cabinet 
ministers in Kabul were not officially resolved. Corruption appeared to be rampant, feeding 
on both the illegal economy (drugs and smuggling) and large transfers of aid money. Several 
government members were commonly seen as linked to the illegal economy. An incident of 
land grabbing in Kabul, involving all but two of the cabinet ministers, came to light in 
September 2003. It was a grim illustration of deceit and arrogance at the highest political 
level in the country. 73 Indicative of the depth of the problem, a clause in the draft constitution 
(chapter 4, art.3) obligated the government to eliminate ‘administrative corruption.’ 
 
While deplorable, political violence associated with the evolving political contest (elections 
and participation in the two loya jirgas), was by the standards of some post-conflict elections 
relatively limited. Threats and intimidations were common, but there were few deaths directly 
associated with the elections or with the council meetings - these occurred at the local level.74 
In Herat, for example, widely perceived to be the most stable area of Afghanistan during this 
period, there were several cases of serious violence against political opposition figures and 
loya jirga candidates.  Manifestations of political freedoms at the central level, including 
criticism by the press and public demonstrations, as permitted by the 1964 constitution, were 
mostly allowed to proceed.75  
 
The degree of the rule of law at the central level was all the more noteworthy in a society that 
was just emerging from two decades of war, with an associated culture of violence, and 
which remained wracked by intense rivalries. The greater observation of the rule of law at the 
central level compared to some regions partly reflected the foreign presence in Kabul, not 
only militarily, but also in terms of economic and political influence.  
 
The rule of law is particularly important in the security sector. Using state force outside the 
realm of the law generates greater insecurity, erodes legitimacy and typically provokes 
escalating violence. Two years after Bonn, problems of abuse of police power remained 
common throughout Afghanistan. Illegitimate or illegal use of military and paramilitary 
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power was a challenge as well, mainly in the provinces, but also involving figures in the 
national government (e.g., the use of intelligence services to intimidate opponents, and failure 
to comply with the Bonn Agreement clause regarding the withdrawal of troops from Kabul). 
Critics noted that the US forces in Afghanistan did not set a good standard by seeming to 
violate the laws of war by detaining and killing civilians, even if the latter was inadvertent. 
5.2. The Bonn Agreement and the Rule of Law 
The Bonn Agreement is framed in the language of establishing the rule of law. The 
agreement emphasizes the formation of a legitimate government through elections and the 
promulgation of an entirely new constitution, and contains specific provisions promoting 
judicial reform and human rights. Related UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN 
Secretary-General’s reports to the Council strengthened this orientation by calling for 
democratic development, which implies accountability under the law, demilitarization, and 
respect for human rights.76 Already in April to May 2002, donors agreed on a division of 
labor for security sector reform - defined to include major rule of law issues - which helped 
institutionalize commitments of support. Individual nations took responsibility for particular 
areas, notably legal reform (Italy), police reform (Germany), and demobilization and 
reintegration (Japan).  
 
At the outset, then, a design was put in place that identified key structural elements to 
establish the rule of law. Of these, we will here examine judicial reform, police reform, and 
human rights.  
 
 
Judicial Reform  
 
The formal legal system was mostly shattered by the time the Afghan Interim Authority was 
established in December 2001. As in the rest of the state apparatus, civil war and Taliban rule 
had wreaked institutional havoc. The Taliban’s brand of justice had been dispensed outside 
what remained of the secular court system. The Bonn Agreement envisaged a process of legal 
reform to be spearheaded by a Judicial Commission, operating within the framework of 
the1964 Constitution. Meanwhile, donors enabled the interim administration to restore the 
basic structure of a functioning legal system by funding the salaries of government officials. 
This included the salaries of officials in the Justice Department both at the central and local 
levels, in addition to the Attorney General’s office.  
 
Legal administrative structures soon resurfaced in the provinces, where judges had remained 
on the payroll and often (at least nominally) in their offices. For instance, an AREU/World 
Bank study on provincial administration estimated that the staff within the judicial sector in 
the two western provinces of Faryab and Herat numbered respectively, 108 and 137 
persons.77 The problem, however, was that the local structures were generally controlled by 
local commanders or self-appointed governors. In such circumstances, the courts were more 
often instruments of injustice than of justice.78 To reform the legal system on the provincial 
level through new appointments, retraining and monitoring consequently depended upon the 
course of political reform in relations between central and local authorities. In this area, there 
had been very little progress (see chapter 2). 
 
The Judicial Commission established by Bonn had a wide and unspecified mandate “to 
rebuild the domestic justice system.”79 The Bonn Agreement did not specify which principles 
  38 
of law were to be applied - that was left to the constitutional process - and the Commission 
was initially paralyzed by the conflict between Islamic principles and secular law. 80 After 
some delays, a reconstituted and renamed Commission - the Judicial Reform Commission - 
was formed in early 2003 with a preponderance of modernists, a move that reflected the 
wishes of the government’s reformists, as well as major donors.  
 
By late 2003 the Commission’s achievements remained quite modest. It had rebuilt some 
courthouses, and started training or assigning advisers to a small number of judges. A study 
was commissioned to examine traditional mechanisms of mediation and adjudication on the 
local level. The official Consultative Group for coordinating government, donor and NGO 
activities in the justice sector was barely functioning. Chaired by the Commission, the CG 
held only two meetings in 2003, had no plans for a budget meeting, and had by late 2003 not 
formalized its terms of reference.81  
  
Part of the problem was local vested interests, as noted above. Equally important was the 
power of Islamic conservatives in both the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, 
representing a structural obstacle to modernist legal reforms. For instance, while the 
Commission defined its agenda, the conservative Chief Justice of the Supreme Court oversaw 
the appointment of 137 judges. Secular critics claimed this was “128 more than [the Supreme 
Court] is arguably competent to appoint.”82 The expectation that fundamental questions 
regarding the role of Islam in Afghan law and society would be addressed in full during the 
Constitutional loya jirga was a further damper on the work of the Commission. Yet - as 
might also have been expected – questions concerning the role of Islam touched upon deep-
seated social differences that could not be resolved by a textual exercise. In the end, the 
question was merely glossed over in the constitutional process and in the new Constitution 
itself. That left the agenda of judicial reform, including the planned review of the country’s 
existing legal codes, to an uncertain future.   
 
 
Reform of the Police  
 
In recognition of the importance of law and order, donors agreed early on to finance and 
rehabilitate the police. A Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) to pay police salaries was 
established under UNDP already in December 2002. Subsequently, Germany (which had 
trained the Afghan police under the country’s modernizing monarch in the 1920s) took lead 
responsibility for retraining the officer corps. The program got off to a quick start; already in 
late 2002 the new officers were visible in Kabul (with shining new anti-riot equipment). A 
new national police school supported by the US was established in May 2003, intended for 
rank-and-file retraining.  
 
As in the Ministry of Defense, reforms were initially hindered by vested interests at the 
central level. Members of the Northern Alliance inner core, the Shura-e Nezar, controlled the 
police department in the Ministry of Interior. This meant, inter alia, that admission to the 
German-supported program at the Kabul Police Academy favored Tajiks, rather than being 
ethnically balanced as formally required. The German mission in Kabul was unable or 
unwilling to do anything about it, awaiting reforms at the ministerial level. These reforms 
started in early 2003 with the appointment of an Afghan-American, ex-Afghan army officer - 
Ali Ahmad Jalali – who was brought in from the United States to serve as Minister of 
Interior. Jalali soon produced a comprehensive 5-year plan for restructuring the police force, 
including a reformed national police of 50,000 persons, a border patrol police, a highway 
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patrol unit, and a Quick Response Unit consisting of 3,000 to 4,000 men based in Kabul for 
deployment to trouble spots throughout the country.  
 
With a reformed ministry and a comprehensive plan, the UN and some observers urgently 
called for additional aid to finance the recurrent budget of police salaries as well as new 
equipment.83 LOTFA was chronically under funded. By mid-2003, only 40 million dollars of 
the 120 million requested had been pledged, and few pledges had actually been paid. “Donor 
contributions are urgently needed,” the UN Secretary-General pleaded in July.84 
 
Other observers doubted that the lack of funds by itself was the most pressing issue.  
While not paying the police could lead to corruption, intimidation and harassment, simply 
adding funding without commensurate institutional change was unlikely to solve such 
problems. Throughout the country, the police - like the courts - were generally controlled by 
local commanders or other strongmen. 85 They acted with impunity (or not) depending on 
their relations with the local power brokers. In Herat, for instance, a police chief reportedly 
involved in assassination attempts on critics of governor Ismail Khan was merely posted to 
the neighboring district when the incidents became known and the central government 
demanded that he be sacked. In Kabul, crime had become a major problem in 2003, and the 
police was widely seen as being among the culprits. Yet when the chief of police was fired 
after the land grabbing incident in September, he reportedly remained free to organize ‘his’ 
men in theft raids in the city. 
 
In this situation, additional funding by itself simply risks inflating an already corrupt 
structure. For this reason, Amnesty International has called for full funding of LOTFA 
provided there is sufficient transparency and professionalism in the police sector.86 A recent 
review by a Geneva-based law center found that the payment of police salaries was held up 
by confused procedures in the Ministry of Interior rather than due to the lack of LOTFA 
funds. More generally, the review noted that few if any respondents cited lack of funds as a 
problem for either judicial or police reform. 87    
  
 
 Human Rights  
 
Violations of human rights in Afghanistan are “unfortunately, routine”, the UN Secretary-
General reported to the General Assembly in December 2003.88 The task of spinning ‘a web 
of constraint’ on those who wield power has largely fallen to civil society - both national and 
international. The transitional administration, the aid agencies and UNAMA have toned down 
human rights issues. It is indicative that the report by the ATA and the aid agencies in 
preparation for the international conference on Afghanistan in early 2004 devotes 1 page out 
of 102 to human rights.89  
 
The development of Afghan human rights mechanisms has been positive. A human rights 
oversight office was recently established in the Ministry of Interio r. The more important 
mechanism, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), was formed on 
schedule as provided for in the Bonn Agreement, but was initially hampered by a 
cumbersome structure of international supervision. Two years after Bonn, however, the 
Commission had become a much stronger institution, with a geographically diversified 
structure and a growing activity of monitoring and education. It was a tribute to its centrality 
in Afghan society that it registered more than twice the number of complaints in 2003 as 
compared to 2002.  
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Greater visibility notwithstanding, the AIHRC remained highly vulnerable, the more so the 
more active it chose to be. Strong and credible international support can reduce its 
vulnerability, as demonstrated by the land grabbing case in Kabul. The AIHRC here took a 
public high profile in exposing the culprits, all of whom were high government officials. A 
main reason that it could do so was that the UN Rapporteur on Housing was in Kabul and had 
already breeched the wall by calling attention to the case. International media attention 
provided further security for the AIHCR. 
 
International NGOs, particularly Human Rights Watch, have kept a close focus on human 
rights in Afghanistan. Its reports have been instrumental for documentation and advocacy 
purposes, and for lending support to AIHRC in its work.  
 
The UN mission, by contrast, has moved in the opposite direction. Despite the centrality of 
human rights in its mandate, UNAMA started out with a weak human rights section. The 
function was divided in a way that deprived human rights of a strong institutional advocate 
within the mission. 90 Subsequent organizational change and staffing decisions weakened the 
human rights component further. Two years after Bonn, UNAMA had only one official 
dedicated to human rights work in the Kabul office. The investigative unit had been 
dismantled and the position of the special human rights advisor to the SRSG had been left 
vacant. A new position for a Rule of Law advisor had long remained unfilled. In the regional 
offices of UNAMA - which have a vital reporting and monitoring function for the entire UN 
system - only a couple had officers with human rights as their primary focus, as against a 
majority of the offices a year earlier. By default, UNHCR ended up monitoring human rights 
in areas where it had protection officers. Yet, general human rights monitoring was not part 
of the agency’s mandate, nor could it be a substitute for regular UNAMA monitoring as it 
occurred only in areas where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) happened 
to be present (e.g., in connection with the large-scale return of Pashtun IDPs to the North). 
 
In retrospect, UNAMA’s role in the human rights sector appears as a consistent strategy to 
complement the political objective of creating stability in the short run, and strengthening the 
centrist-modernist orientation of the government in the longer run. The strategy was crafted 
by the SRSG, who by virtue of his stature wielded an extraordinary influence on the mission 
(including staffing policy). The priorities were evident in the language of the SRSG - which 
was an ‘order and stability’ rather than ‘rights’ language - as well as in his actions.  For 
instance, when challenged by the dominant military-political faction of the interim authority, 
Brahimi had chosen to accommodate rather than confront violations of the rules governing 
the Emergency loya jirga. More than a year later, he again chose accommodation on a rights 
issue - the land grab incident - and this time in public.91 Similarly, he consistently 
recommended caution with respect to transitional justice. 
 
The stability argument evidently carried great weight in the complex issue of how to address 
past human rights violations.92 Key members of the trans itional administration were 
suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Investigation would have meant a 
major operation involving police or military personnel to secure sites and protect witnesses as 
well as investigators. If opened, it was unclear how far back in history investigations should 
go in order to create a balance of sorts. These considerations became arguments invoked by 
UNAMA against launching a process of transitional justice. In sum, as a UNAMA official 
said, transitional justice belongs properly to a post-conflict situation, and Afghanistan is not 
there yet.93 Ranged on the other side were the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
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Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir, and international human rights 
organizations. In Geneva, however, the UN Human Rights Commission decided in March 
2003 not to establish an independent commission of inquiry as Jahangir had recommended, 
and since then the matter has rested there. On the Afghan side, the AIHRC has 
understandably been unwilling to move independently on a course that could put the lives of 
their members at great risk.94 
 
In the framework of international assistance to Afghanistan, human rights is a ‘cross-cutting 
issue’. As such it has a slot in the Advisory Group (AG) part of the aid-coordination 
structure, which appears to function similarly to the Consultative Groups. Nevertheless, by 
not being a distinct sector for program support, human rights may well be further 
marginalized in the reconstruction process. Given the political sensitivity of the issues, many 
donors find this unfortunate, yet believe it is necessary. This applies above all to questions of 
transitional justice. The US, in particular, opposes investigation and made this clear in the 
Geneva round of the Human Rights Commission in March 2003. But the European Union has 
also downplayed human rights in the current reconstruction context. The aid strategy adopted 
by the Commission in February 2003 mentioned human rights as one of several cross-cutting 
issues but singled out four other cross-cutting areas for support:  women’s rights, unexploded 
ordnance, drug production and refugees and IDPs.95  
 
The centrality of women’s rights in the international hostility towards the Taliban regime 
made this a priority area for donor support under the new regime. The Afghan transitional 
authorities have expressed commitment to women’s rights in principle as well. As a result, 
important institutional changes have occurred. Women were guaranteed a certain 
participatory quota in the constitutional process in 2003, a quota of reserved seats in the 
future parliament (64 of 250 seats in the lower house), ministerial representation in the 
cabinet (with a Ministry of Women’s Affairs and a State Minister for Women), and a semi-
formal caucus in the government-donor aid structure. In tradition-bound rural areas, however, 
the realities of women’s rights have barely changed as a result of the regime change, and 
there is considerable resistance to pursuing the issue across all levels. The obstacles ahead 
were indicated by the struggle over the language in the new Constitution, where a neutral 
non-gender language ultimately had to give way to one that specifically identified women as 
bearers of rights. 
5.3. Conclusions 
Given the enormous challenge of rebuilding a shattered legal system in conditions of sharply 
contested traditions of law, it was to be expected that judicial reform in Afghanistan would 
progress slowly. Forging legal norms is part of a broader process of political and social 
change that cannot easily be subjected to a schedule set by donors or international meetings. 
To impose modernism in this area may be irrelevant or counterproductive, as the experience 
of the Judicial Reform Commission indicates. In this area, incrementalism may be more 
appropriate. 
 
Two years after Bonn, reform of both the courts and the police remain hampered by the 
presence of power brokers that have generally set themselves above the law, both at the local 
and central levels. Structural obstacles of this kind suggest that increased funding, as called 
for by both the UN and transitional authorities, is not by itself a solution. On the contrary, 
unless carefully calibrated with institutional change, greater aid transfers may simply inflate a 
corrupt structure. 
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Human rights have to some extent been orphaned in the reconstruction process. UNAMA has 
a clear mandate to promote human rights, but has effectively been winding down its function. 
No donor (or group of donors) has a similar mandate, and none has taken on a strong 
advocacy role. On the Afghan side, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has 
been quite active despite its inherently vulnerable position. It desperately needs political 
support from the international community to continue its work without jeopardizing the 
security of its staff. 
 
There are obvious reasons why the ATA and the international aid community have assigned a 
low priority to human rights, with the exception of women’s rights. Considerations of short-
term stability, and the priorities of major donors (particularly the US), represent real 
constraints. Heavy-handed interventionism risks being counterproductive. Yet these 
constraints are endemic to post-war situations of conflictual peacebuilding such as in 
Afghanistan. They were undoubtedly obvious at the time of the Bonn Agreement as well. Yet 
by announcing principles of high standards, the UN Security Council – although to a lesser 
extent the Bonn Agreement itself – prepared the ground for a huge gap between ideals and 
reality.  
 
The discrepancy between the map and the terrain, so to speak, raises fundamental questions 
that have no obviously correct answers. Was it wise to impose an ambitious human rights 
language on a peacebuilding mission of this kind? The UN was asked to simultaneously 
supervise reconstruction, lay the foundations for Western-style political democracy, and 
introduce a human rights regime as well. Would it have been better to explicitly announce the 
sequential approach that appears to have evolved in practice? Or does a declaration of 
principles constitute a necessary basis for progressively constraining all actors concerned 
according to the standards of the rule of law? 
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6. SECURITY 
Moving from a security environment in which various armed actors constitute the major 
threat in the life of most Afghans, to one where there is a legitimate authority controlling the 
means of coercion, is at the core of peacebuilding. No recipe exists for the sequencing of 
security reforms in relation to other reforms – particularly those in the political domain – and 
Afghanistan remains a particularly challenging case in that the success of peacebuilding 
hinges on bringing aboard many of the forces that also constitute the major threats to security. 
The policies of the US, as the dominant external actor, has been a prime obstacle in this 
regard through its support of the warlords that helped to topple the Taliban regime, through 
its repeated offensives in the South and East, which are becoming a security problem in their 
own right, and, some observe rs would add, by initially preventing the expansion of an 
international security force beyond Kabul. Building or reforming a new Afghan security 
sector has been slow. The process gained some momentum in the latter half of 2003 despite a 
deteriorating secur ity situation which threatens to undermine the political process stipulated 
in Bonn. By early 2004, the prospects of holding elections with even some minimum of 
legitimacy by the middle of the year were looking increasingly grim. 
6.1. Security in the Bonn Agreement 
The Bonn Agreement provides only a vague framework for addressing the security situation. 
The Agreement was negotiated at a time when the armed forces of the Northern Alliance had 
gained full control in Kabul, despite some warnings from the US no t to enter the capital. 
Equally important, the US was intent on maintaining the military capacity of the Northern 
Alliance and its constituent groups for their continuing warfare. In this environment, the 
Treaty negotiated at Bonn became conspicuously vague on security issues. It contains only a 
declaration of intent, rather than a detailed agreement that would identify mechanisms for the 
transfer of authority, the composition of a future security apparatus, and clear timelines. 
 
Four provisions of the Bonn Agreement address security issues.96 In the body of the text, 
there is the principal statement that all armed forces will come under the command of the 
Afghan Interim Authority, to be reorganized in line with the needs of its future security 
apparatus. Appendix I on the ‘International Security Force’ has three more provisions. 
Firstly, the international community is asked to assist in the establishment and training of 
new forces. Secondly, the UN Security Council is asked to authorize a security force which 
‘will assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas’, opening the 
way for expansion at a later date. Thirdly, the Afghan parties agree to pull all their armed 
forces out from Kabul (or other areas) as the international security force is deployed.  
  
Except for the international security force in Kabul, all of these provisions would prove 
difficult to implement.97 The absence of a clear framework on security stands in clear contrast 
to the much more concise formulation for the political process, a tension that is at the heart of 
the troubled of transition. While it would have been unrealistic to expect rapid reform of the 
armed forces in a situation where the national authority is deeply disputed, it has proved 
virtually impossible to encourage popular participation in the political process as long as 
political influence largely remains the equivalent of military power, still held largely by local 
and regional warlords. The problems of meeting upcoming deadlines in the political process – 
  44 
particularly holding popular elections – seem to go hand in hand with a gradually declining 
security situation. 
6.2. The Security Situation 
There is no consensus on what it is that constitutes the dominant security threat in present day 
Afghanistan. This is partly a question of divergent perspectives: who you identify is largely a 
reflection of what your mission is, as reflected in the Coalition’s preoccupation with Al Qaida 
and the Taliban as the major threat. Also, in Afghanistan’s increasingly troubled security 
environment, it is worth being reminded that security is as much about not having to take 
precautions, about people’s ability to move about and express their opinions freely, issues 
that proved critical in both the Emergency loya jirga (summer 2002) and the Constitutional 
loya jirga (December 2003), and are equally so with regard to holding general elections in 
2004.  
 
The southern and eastern parts of the country, which together constitute the Pashtun 
heartlands from where the Taliban emerged, have seen a dramatic worsening of security, 
particularly through the latter half of 2003. There are frequent attacks on aid workers, the 
government and the national army, as well as on Coalition forces. A significant share of those 
incidents is politically motivated, and are executed by fragments of the Taliban, or by 
international Al Qaida elements. Across the border in Pakistan, there is significant support for 
those groups, both from the provincial governments of the bordering provinces, Baluchistan 
and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and from elements within the army and the 
intelligence services. A recent report indicate that bases are increasingly being set up in 
Afghanistan. 98 One of the fundamental mistakes of the US-led Coalition is probably its 
insistence that the Taliban and Al Qaida are one and the same, which is contrary to local 
knowledge and is likely to generate support for Taliban in Afghan villages targeted in 
Coalition forces campaigns. 
 
From the perspective of a common citizen in the major Pashtun belt, the presence of 
Coalition forces – which they encounter mainly in the context of highly insensitive house 
searches or when delivering deadly air cargo – may be the major security threat. Linked to 
the virtual absence of aid or economic progress in the same areas, and to a feeling of losing 
out in the fight over positions and political influence in the future Afghanistan, this has 
undermined popular confidence in the peace process. Remnants of the Taliban, of whom 
people do not necessarily have particularly fond memories, stand out as the only alternative. 
While communities often have the capacity to prevent armed incidents in their areas - unless 
they have been forcibly disarmed by the Coalition forces - they do not have a motive for 
putting themselves at risk. As a result, they end up by de facto endorsing the attacks. 
Simultaneously, there are multiple reports from aid agencies which have found that host 
communities have mediated deals with the Taliban groups that enable them to continue work. 
 
In the North, there is a different pattern. Consistent tension and occasional battles between 
armed groups associated with the government is one problem, such as between Abdul Rashid 
Dostum and Mohammad Atta in the areas around and to the West of Mazar-e Sharif. In the 
latter case, this has led the UN to initiate a Security Commission that includes representatives 
of the major parties in the area. The commission has proved unable to significantly disarm the 
units in the area, as is its stated objective, but has had some success in preventing outbreaks 
of armed conflict.99  
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In the Northwestern province of Herat, ruled by old-time mujahedin commander Ismail Khan 
and seemingly the least conflict-prone area of the country, a relative calm is only disturbed by 
occasional attacks on political opposition figures that are widely believed to be part of a local 
power game. For example, Herat’s long term chief judge, Khodaidad, was hit by a car in the 
city’s main bazaar in early October 2003, but only lightly injured. Khodaidad was the head of 
the Herat professional shura, which has been the most visible corrective to Ismail Khan’s 
leadership.100 The incident is just one in a series that has effectively curbed the activities of 
the professional shura, and sent a strong signal to others carrying similar ambitions. 
 
Carefully measured and targeted violence, or even subtle threats, are quite effective in 
curbing political dissent, as is evident also in Kabul. Oral harassment, threats, and physical 
‘warnings’ form part of the political game and were particularly frequent in the context of the 
two loya jirga gatherings. There may be a decline in overt physical violence while political 
debate continues to be repressed - even when battles are resolved without a shootout, the 
specter of deployable armed capacity remains the key factor. 
 
Crime is another component in the post-Taliban security tableau. It is not always easily 
distinguishable from political acts, particularly because the disorder created by the latter is 
easily exploited to engage in the former. In Kabul, crime has become a major problem. The 
lines between crime, politically motivated resistance and legitimate government are blurred, 
as SRSG Brahimi made clear in his speech to the National Symposium on Secur ity Sector 
Reform in Kabul in late July 2003:  
 
(…) we continue to receive daily reports of abuses by gunmen against the population 
– armed gangs who establish illegal checkpoints, tax farmers and traders, intimidate, 
rob, rape and do so – all to often – which wielding the formal title of military 
commander, police or security chief.101 
 
This is just another side of the problem of installing and continuing to support many of 
Afghanistan’s pre-Taliban rulers. It is one reason why many Afghans with first-hand 
experience of crime, power abuse and fighting were only reservedly enthusiastic in late 2001. 
The warnings were many, yet the will of the international community to constrain destructive 
forces on the anti-Taliban side has proved limited. 
 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom 
 
A key challenge to the overall peacebuilding process has been the fact that the US, as the 
dominant actor within the armed coalition, has seen the military struggle against remnants of 
the Taliban and Al Qaida as the task with the highest priority.  
 
The way events have unfolded on the political scene has to a large extent reflected the 
alliance between the Coalition forces and Afghanistan’s former warlords. Seeing them as 
useful instruments also after the collapse of the Taliban regime, the US continued to provide 
a number of these once powerful figures with money, finance and – ultimately – political 
legitimacy. Attempts by the central government to coopt the warlords were largely 
unsuccessful, as the warlords preferred strengthening their local power base rather than 
moving on to a highly uncertain position in the government (the major exception being 
Fahim, who joined the government as a Minister of Defense at a time when he controlled 
almost all armed forces in the capital).102 In those few cases where the government was able 
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to sideline or transfer former mujahedin commanders, support from the Americans was 
important. This was the case in Khost, where Padsha Khan Zadran – a US ally challenging 
the appointed governor - was effectively dethroned when the US forces started to see him as 
an obstacle to the war on Al Qaida and the Taliban. When Gul Agha Shirzai, the governor of 
Kandahar, was transferred to Kabul and replaced with Eng. Pashtun, a close ally of Karzai, 
this complied with Coalition prio rities – although the primary cause may have been Shirzai 
realizing he was gradually losing strength.  
 
Overall there has been considerable consistency in the Coalition’s endorsement of the 
warlords over the whole post 9/11 period. The policy of supporting local warlords was 
brought one step further when a US military spokesman announced on 7 February 2004 that 
US forces had begun training and equipping ‘a new Afghan militia force’ to help in 
operations against Taliban and Al Qaida. The force was distinct from the planned Afghan 
National Army (ANA), and was characterized as a temporary force.103 The announcement 
came at a time when President Karzai, the UN and the international donor community were 
urgently trying to accelerate demobilization of militia forces in time for the planned elections.  
 
While there were plenty of predictions that the Coalition forces would be met with a reaction 
similar to that of the Soviets in the 1980s or the British long before that, the reality proved 
much more nuanced. Initially, the Coalition forces were greatly helped by the massive 
popular frustration with the Taliban, as well as their increasingly influential guests. The US-
led war fought to defeat the Taliban in 2001 had a high human cost; by the best available 
estimate, about 5,500 civilians were killed and 5,100 injured, not counting soldiers hastily 
conscripted to serve on the Taliban side.104 Many Afghans nevertheless seemed to conclude 
that the benefits outweighed the costs. This picture is gradually changing, especially in the 
South and the East, as a result of the US support to warlords, its intervention in politics, and 
the continuation of a war effort that is increasingly unpopular. The last major campaign was 
launched to keep the Constitutional loya jirga in check, and included two heavily publicized 
incidents in which a number of children were killed in aerial bombardment. 
 
At the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, there is a general sense that the Coalition forces 
are part of an international commitment to support a united and peaceful Afghanistan. That 
commitment – symbolized by international forces, including those of the US – is seen as a 
guarantor against renewed civil war.  
 
‘Peacebuilding’ actors are operating in an environment where the present OEF intervention, 
and the continuing warfare, are dominant facts of life – a reality that has come to be 
symbolized by the B-52 bomber. UN negotiators and others have adapted to the context by 
including the specter of the B-52 in their diplomatic toolbox, although using it only carefully, 
realizing that their ability to request armed intervention is very limited. As the Coalition 
forces have demonstrated, their task is to pursue the war against the Taliban and Al Qaida, 
not to facilitate a political process of peacebuilding. Nonetheless, the practice of carefully 
pressuring non-compliant actors into line by displaying (or just recalling) an image of what 
may fall from the sky has come to be known as ‘B-52 diplomacy’. 
6.3. The ISAF Force 
In line with one of the provisions in the Bonn Agreement, the Security Council passed a 
resolution on 20 December 2001 authorizing the deployment of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to Kabul and the surrounding areas (Res. 1386/2001). The force was 
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set up as a ‘coalition of the willing’, allowing for greater speed and flexibility in comparison 
to a force set up by the UN.105 Its relationship to the UN mission was formulated as one of 
‘close consultation’.  
 
The Northern Alliance was militarily in control of Kabul from 13 November 2001 and had 
made it clear that they saw no need for an international security force.106 The controversy 
over this in Bonn led to the provisions on security outlined above, including a limited 
international force.  
 
The Security Council resolution clearly confined the mandate to Kabul and the surrounding 
areas, whereas the text from Bonn had opened the way for an expansion. The limited mandate 
represented was acceptable to the Northern Alliance and, more importantly, the US, which 
did not want an interna tional security force outside of Kabul where it could become an 
obstacle to the continued war on Al Qaida and the Taliban.  
 
The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as well as his Special Representative, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, have consistently advocated an expansion of the security force. While this was 
effectively precluded by the US position, it was also unclear how such a force would operate. 
Specifically, given the entrenchment of old-time warlords, it was difficult to see how to avoid 
the uncomfortable choice between cooperation (which would legitimize them) and 
confrontation (which carried the prospect of military confrontation).107 In the absence of a 
political will to expand among the major actors, confronting this dilemma was not necessary. 
Meanwhile, the local commanders rebuilt their military, economic and political strength.  
 
Most observers agree that the ISAF force has played an important role in preventing violent 
acts and in securing a necessary minimum of ‘neutral political space’ in Kabul.108 ISAF’s 
policy, in line with that promoted by SRSG Brahimi, has been to maintain as low key a 
presence as possible. The dilemma is that this policy may inadvertently come to be seen as an 
endorsement of military pressure from the Northern Alliance. The now classic example 
occurred during the Emergency loya jirga in June 2002, when Defense Minister Fahim, who 
controlled the bulk of armed force in Kabul, demanded access for the intelligence service to 
the meeting hall. The decision by Brahimi to yield to Fahim’s demands resulted in a council 
meeting characterized by threats and intimidation, and, more generally, served to endorse the 
use of military threat to limit the democratic process.  
 
In November 2003, the Security Council passed a new resolution which opened the path for 
the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul. This preceded the deployment of a German force to 
Kunduz in the North-East, and by January 2004 a further expansion of ISAF was under 
serious debate in NATO circles. Another possibility is placing the Coalition force under 
ISAF’s NATO command. The NATO takeover of the ISAF command from last summer has 
laid the foundations for such a move, although this has contributed further to confuse the 
distinction between the war-making and political stabilization functions of the military. Being 
the first NATO assignment outside Europe, the Afghanistan engagement is a test case for an 
alliance still struggling to define its post-Cold War role, and is therefore ‘condemned to 
success’. The NATO engagement significantly decreases the likelihood that ISAF will be 
short- lived, while placing Afghanistan at the crux of debates about NATO’s future (and US-
European relations). 
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The Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
 
Afghanistan has become a testing ground for new roles played by the military in peace 
operations, most prominently through the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
launched at a Coalition press conference in November 2002 (initially under the name ‘Joint 
Regional Teams’). Other actors, including the Afghan transitional administration, the UN and 
NGOs, were largely taken by surprise. Initially the teams were to consist of up to 100 men, 
combining combat forces, military assistance personnel and civilian expertise. The tasks 
included coordination of assistance, needs assessments, liaison with regional commanders, 
implementation of assistance, and security, with an emphasis on preparing the ground for the 
assertion of the authority of the central government in the provinces. This blend of military, 
economic and political functions provoked strong reactions from other actors, NGOs in 
particular, who saw it as a dangerous confusion of roles.109 NGOs were also concerned that 
the American PRTs, as part of OEF, would be an instrument of intelligence-gathering, as well 
as exerting some control- through-coordination over allegedly unruly humanitarian 
organizations. 
 
The PRTs have been much discussed in the aid community, and the Coalition has responded 
by developing a more nuanced concept that would receive wider recognition. Yet, 
contradictory statements from the Coalition side have continued to create confusion. 110 As it 
stands, the PRT concept refers to a variety of different mandates and forms of organization, 
and is as such difficult to pin down. Essentially, however, this is a debate that is driven by the 
need to find new forms of military engagement in international peace support operations that 
are encountering increasingly grave constraints in terms of both financing and personnel 
available. 
 
At the core of the debate about PRTs is whether the primary mandate lies in reconstruction or 
in security. US officials have tended to emphasize the former, while the British, who 
launched their first PRT in Mazar-e Sharif in July 2003, have emphasized the latter. The 
British model inc ludes various contributions to security sector reform. With PRTs so far 
operating mainly in the safer areas of Afghanistan, where other actors also operate, they have 
added little value on the reconstruction scene, where they lack adequate experience and tend 
to be expensive. Additionally, operating in the same domain as humanitarian agencies, PRTs 
contribute to a blurring of the distinction between military and aid personnel, which the latter 
see as a great risk, citing the rise in attacks on aid personnel during 2003. 
 
By early 2004, PRTs had not been deployed in the most insecure areas, and it remains to be 
seen whether they can function there. The PRTs are light units even when security is their 
primary mandate. Rather than keeping peace through deterrence, the objective is to manage 
conflicts through presence, observation, negotiation and selective protection. The idea is to 
create ‘islands of stability’, where people can start reaping the peace dividend and hence set 
an example to be emulated. The viability of this idea has not been convincingly demonstrated 
in the safe areas where the PRTs work today, which makes it even more unlikely that the 
teams can make much difference in the more insecure areas. The PRTs may also act as 
magnets for militant attacks. In early 2004, the US announced its plan to launch PRTs in 
Khost, Asadabad and Ghazni, adding to the ones operating already. 111 In those areas, the 
PRTs will be working close to the Coalition forces, which are already a target for attacks. 
 
So far, the PRTs have operated under an OEF mandate, except for the Germans in Kunduz 
who are part of the NATO-led ISAF force.112 New PRT deployments, including an expected 
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Nordic team (possibly in cooperation with the UK), may be set up under ISAF leadership. 
Over time, it may also be that OEF teams (from the US, UK and New Zealand) will come 
under ISAF command. Inadvertently, the use of the same concept to connote an element in 
the widely differing OEF and ISAF operations adds to the confusion.  
 
The PRT concept, aimed at opening up a debate on redefining the use of military capacity in 
peacebuilding contexts, has been bogged down by its close association with the war effort 
through the OEF, but also by the tensions inherent in its definition. Before moving on to 
make PRTs the cornerstone of ISAF’s presence outside Kabul, one ought to take a solid step 
back so as to sum up the experiences so far and to clarify mandates (including the interface 
with other actors), which is ultimately likely to lead to a new concept more in line with what 
the teams should do – which ought to have security at the centre. 
 
 
Reforming the Security Sector 
 
Before the ink of the signature to the Bonn agreement was dry, the one concrete security 
provision in it was violated – the Northern Alliance, with Defense Minister Fahim at the 
helm, refused to withdraw its forces from Kabul. The soon-to-be-deployed ISAF force was 
not in a position to do anything about it. The US policy was that Fahim was an important ally 
in the overall war against Al Qaida and the Taliban, and that – as a potential spoiler – he must 
be kept within the political process at the centre. Even if the ISAF deployment was 
significant, the entrenchment of Fahim’s forces in the capital prevented Kabul from 
becoming the complete ‘neutral political space’ envisioned by the Bonn Agreement.  
 
For similar reasons, the much more ambitious aim of bringing all armed forces under the 
command of the transitional administration proved difficult to implement. With a government 
consisting of opposing armed factions whose leaders had little trust in each other, with 
regional militia commanders who wanted to have as little to do with the centre as possible, 
integrating the armed forces and making them subject to one command was difficult. 
Moreover, if it had been partly successful at that stage in the political process, it would have 
meant the strengthening of one party at the expense of others. An alternative approach would 
have been to aim at demobilization first – ensuring parity between groups – and then move on 
to integrating the forces, which would probably have required the presence of an international 
stabilization force (or observer units) in all the major towns. 
 
The building of the Afghan National Army was at first closely linked to the quest to bring 
militia fighters under central authority, with commanders encouraged to introduce candidates. 
By late 2003, some 10,000 soldiers had been trained in the new program, but there were 
reports of desertion rates in the 25-50 percent range. The high rates were partially attributed 
to poor wages, but more importantly to the issues of having been forcibly recruited and 
having maintained allegiances to their original group.113 The slow pace of building a national 
army, combined with doubts about its competence, means that more will be required from the 
international presence in resolving urgent upcoming security challenges, such as the 2004 
election. Arguably it will also require a longer term ISAF presence. 
 
The fact that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) quickly became factionalized added to the 
problems. Fahim, the minister, appointed 100 generals during the interim administration 
period (December 2001-June 2002), of whom 90 were of Pansjiri Tajik origin.114 Later 
efforts to redress the imbalance have been partly successful in broadening the representation, 
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but at least one close observer has concluded that the main authority remains with Fahim and 
others from the Pansjiri group.115 The increasing international interest in investing in the 
police, as discussed in chapter 5, reflects the fact that the international community has more 
confidence in Minister Jalali, who is one of the major reformists in the government and 
reliably pro-Karzai. On security reform, then, progress has been piecemeal and slow, yet one 
could argue that simply keeping Fahim aboard, considering his potential for undermining the 
process, is a success in its own right. 
 
Specific provisions for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of 
soldiers were not included in the Bonn Agreement due to the reluctance of the Northern 
Alliance, but also reflecting the fact that this was not an agreement between parties to a war, 
rather an agreement between victors only. At the security sector donor conference in Geneva 
in April 2002, however, DDR was formulated as one pillar, with Japan being allocated a 
primary role.116 Despite ambitious plans, progress has been slow on the DDR front, which 
again brings questions of appropriate sequencing to the fore. In a situation where insecurity is 
on the rise, where there has been little progress in effectively ameliorating tensions between 
various armed factions, and where the international actors have proved their unwillingness to 
confront power abuses, serious incentives to disarm do not exist. By late October 2003, DDR 
was starting in three carefully selected areas of the country (Gardez, Bamyan, Kunduz), all of 
which were relatively peaceful, in addition to hosting PRTs. 
 
The DDR program has other critical components.117 Community capacity, including 
employment, is one such factor. The slow pace of economic reconstruction, and the pressure 
from a population (including a large group of returnees) eager to rebuild their lives, means 
that militia engagement may for now seem the best option for many individuals. A different, 
yet essential concern, has been the inability to collect heavy arms, which – in a country where 
small arms are likely to remain a household necessity– is the critical issue. By January 2004, 
there was seemingly some progress in Kabul in this regard, and while critics would argue this 
simply concerns inoperable equipment, this may also prove to be the first step to 
disarmament proper.118 
6.4. Conclusions 
With the exception of Kabul, the security environment in Afghanistan remains as fragile as 
when the new interim authority was installed, while in a large area in the South and the East 
the situation has deteriorated. The international military presence – ISAF in Kabul and 
Kunduz, and the US-led Coalition elsewhere – is probably essential for maintaining 
confidence and momentum in the political process, thereby preventing renewed armed 
conflict. At the same time, the Coalition forces also contribute to general insecurity in areas 
where they operate, and their military offensives in the South and East have not prevented, 
and might have stimulated, a rise in terrorist activity in 2003.  
 
Enhancing security by military means without progress on the economic and political fronts 
is difficult. Economically, there needs to be sufficient progress for people to uphold the 
expectation of a peace dividend, whereas politically, tensions need to be addressed in a 
manner that contravenes the double game that is still being pursued by most of the warlords. 
There has been a fundamental unwillingness by international actors to confront those who 
continue to undermine the peace process, and this has contributed to diluting confidence in 
the peace process, which again contributes to escalating insecurity in some areas. At the same 
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time, there has been little effort to address the Taliban problem through political means, 
although Karzai held out the incentive of negotiating with ‘moderate Taliban’. 
 
The Coalition’s response to terrorism in Afghanistan – seeing international radicals and 
indigenous opposition such as the Taliban as one and the same – has proved 
counterproductive. A possible reorientation, which is likely to be widely supported amongst 
most Afghans, would be to address Taliban remnants and related Afghan opposition 
primarily by political means, while working closely with Afghanistan’s new army to fight the 
internationals. Recent signals from the US and NATO about bringing OEF and ISAF closer 
together, expanding the use of PRTs to troubled areas, and expanding ISAF generally, may 
be steps in the right direction.  
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7. THE REGION 
It is commonly agreed that the regional environment is critical for progress in peacebuilding. 
For Afghanistan, conflicts and alliances in the larger region, within as well as between states, 
have interacted with internal Afghan divisions and form an integral part of the domestic 
conflict scene.  The fact that the states surrounding Afghanistan do not come together in any 
organized security forum, nor for that matter constitute a ‘security community’ in even its 
loosest sense, adds to the problem.119 In the past, Afghanistan has often become the scene for 
the playing out of conflicts elsewhere, such as the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, 
which has shaped the Afghan engagement in both countries.  
 
At present, the regional dimension does not figure prominently on the peacebuilding agenda, 
partly because it has been consciously toned down by key actors including the Afghan 
government, partly because the US presence serves to contain overt involvement of states in 
the region. Although alignments in the region have been considerably altered by post-9/11 
developments, most regional actors maintain and cultivate their networks in Afghanistan. 
There has been only partial progress towards converting harmful interference into 
constructive engagement for the rebuilding of the country. 
7.1. The Framework 
In the political climate surrounding the US-led intervention, there was a widely shared sense 
that the intervention offered an opportunity to alter the course, not only of Afghan polity, but 
also of the larger region. It therefore seems paradoxical that the regional context is referred to 
in the Bonn Agreement only in the form of introductory phrases on self-determination and 
independence. Compared to the past two decades of political talks and settlements relating to 
Afghanistan, the role of Afghanistan’s crucial neighborhood received scant emphasis in the 
Bonn talks, as well as in the resulting text. 
 
It was widely considered as a major step forward when Lakhdar Brahimi, the head of the UN 
Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), in 1997 initiated the so-called Six Plus Two 
Group, which included all Afghanistan's neighbouring states, as well as Russia and the US.120 
The current UNAMA policy, under Brahimi’s second term in the country, is largely to 
consult individually with the relevant countries, rather than retain the Six Plus Two as a 
common institutional forum.  
 
In this respect, UNAMA’s policy harmonizes with policy instincts in the Afghan Cabinet. As 
Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong have pointed out, Afghans tend to ‘attribute their 
country’s misfortune to interference by their neighbours … and are wary of engaging them, at 
least without adequate security guarantees from third parties.’121 While this may be 
understandable, as a policy it is hardly sustainable. Arguably, it would have been wiser for 
UNAMA to take a more proactive role in bringing consultations with the states of the region 
into a common institutional framework. Instead, inter-state relations in the region largely 
unfold on a bilateral basis, between neighbouring states, between Afghanistan and its 
neighbours, and in relation to states outside of the region.  
 
The reluctance of the government to address directly the issue of formalized regional 
cooperation reflects the sensitivity of the issue. Various players in the government continue to 
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cultivate individual relations with their respective patrons, and addressing the regional 
dimension may be further divisive.  
 
The disinclination to address regional relations in a common policy was evident in the 
formulation of the National Development Framework in May 2002, which made no reference 
to the regional context, e.g. , in terms of trade, investment, or exchange of competence.122 
More recently, the regional dimension has not been entirely neglected. In December 2002, the 
Karzai government invited representatives of the six neighbouring states to sign the Kabul 
Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, which is a “commitment to constructive and 
supportive bilateral relationships based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual 
respect, friendly relations, cooperation and non- interference in each other’s internal 
affairs.”123 The declaration, however, is formulated in very general terms and does not 
mention the possibility of formalizing multilateral relations.  
7.2. Changing Alignments 
The importance of 9/11 in the regional perspective is clear: the reentry of the US in 
Afghanistan has been the driving force behind most other changes in the political and security 
architecture.  
 
Pakistan’s strongman, General Musharaf, has become a central ally in the US war on 
terrorism, and has cleverly been using this to strengthen his power domestically and gain 
legitimacy internationally. By early 2004, there was little left of the central role Pakistan had 
earlier played in Afghanistan. This has created considerable resentment in parts of the Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI), the Army, and some of the religious parties, who allegedly are 
instrumental in supporting Al Qaida, and Taliban leaders and activists in Pakistan. 
Musharaf’s strategy of aligning with the US is widely contested in Pakistan. Additionally, 
indications are that central actors increasingly doubt that even relative peace will prevail in 
Afghanistan. Recent signs of a rapprochement with India over Kashmir is likely to further 
stimulate tension in Pakistan, yet could in the longer term have positive implications for 
Afghanistan. 
 
The strong positioning of India in post-Taliban Afghanistan is striking, and particularly so if 
seen from a Pakis tani perspective. The Indian engagement is part of a larger strategy, which 
has resulted in an Indian presence in much of Central Asia, drawing on the country’s long-
standing collaboration with Russia and emerging relationship with Iran. While India was a 
key supporter of Afghanistan’s so-called communist regime (1978-1992), its role during the 
mujahedin and Taliban eras of the 1990s was far less prominent.  Over the past two years the 
Indian government has firmly established itself in Afghanistan, both diplomatically (with four 
consulates and a large Kabul embassy) and in reconstruction activities. Many of the projects 
in which Indians are involved are in the Pashtun belt close the Pakistani border, and include 
such highly sensitive projects as dam construction on the Kunar and Kabul rivers which flow 
into Pakistan and are major sources of water for agriculture there.  
 
With its own intense power struggle between radicals and reformists, Iran is strongly affected 
by the US reentry in the region. Yet the Iranian government expresses strong support for the 
new Afghan administration in Kabul, in words and deeds, balancing that against a perceived 
need to continue courting its major protégés, Ismail Khan in Herat, the Shiite parties in the 
centre, and partly the Pansjiri faction in the government. In a similar vein, Iran has 
participated in the reconstruction process, most visibly by rebuilding the road from the 
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Iranian-Afghan border to Herat. Iran is actively marketing itself, based on linguistic and 
cultural affinities, as a source of competence, partly through seconded Iranian professionals, 
partly through returning Afghans. In the Kabul administration, many suspect that these offers 
are Trojan horses, and that the major objective is political influence rather than economic 
reconstruction. 
 
To the north, where Afghanistan borders on the three former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, it is the latter that has emerged as the main ally of the US. 
Amongst these three, Uzbekistan has the largest population, is economically the most 
significant, and while its border with Afghanistan is relatively short, it has inherited attractive 
Soviet military infrastructure from the 1980s. The new importance of President Islam 
Karimov was underscored by the fact that within a span of 6 months from October 2001 to 
March 2002, he was visited by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, and was invited to Washington to see President George W. Bush. Human rights 
groups have been extremely critical, arguing that Washington condones Karimov’s political 
repression and severe human rights violations at home, which is bad enough its own right, 
and contributes to the recruitment of radical Islamist groups as well.124 
 
Afghanistan’s two powerful neighbors, Russia and China, have both met the new situation 
with extreme caution. China continues to have a minor presence in Afghanistan (merely some 
small businesses). Russia pushed hard just after 9/11 to play a major role in Afghanistan’s 
future, both in the security and economic domains, but with little success.  Currently, it is a 
low-visibility actor, although serious concerns remain regarding its relationships with former 
protégé groups, including unreported arms supplies to Kabul's defense minister. The 
overarching concern of Russia’s leadership seems to be Russian relations with Europe, which 
makes the (possibly temporary) loss of influence in Afghanistan acceptable. 
7.3. Conclusions 
Regional cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbors is complicated by the multitude of 
foreign policy and security interests, many of which have nothing to do directly with 
Afghanistan. Sharp differences in political cultures and administrative systems form another 
obstacle to regional cooperation. 
 
Against this background, Kabul’s strategy of largely bilateral engagement with its neighbours 
may be understandable, but it has obvious shortcomings. A multilateral forum might ease 
mutual suspicion and create a structure for sustained positive involvement. This of course 
would be even more important in the future, when international interest in maintaining a 
military presence and in funding the reconstruction tapers off. At that time, Afghanistan will 
again become heavily dependent upon relations with its neighbors. At present, the 
involvement of Afghanistan’s neighbors seems to be aimed as much at maintaining options in 
case of renewed conflict as it does at contributing to peacebuilding and reconstruction.  
 
Ultimately, the challenge is to build relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors that are 
sufficiently strong to function independently of US policy and a possible reduction in US 
forces. In this perspective, current policies that focus on building a viable political system in 
Afghanistan, while – at least temporarily – isolating it from its regional context, seem short-
sighted. 
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8. NORWAY’S ROLE 
While Norway had maintained a considerable humanitarian program in Afghanistan 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the onset of the ‘global war on terror’ marked a watershed 
in the significance of its engagement. Overnight, Afghanistan moved to the core in the 
discourse on how Norway should position itself in the rapidly shifting politics of global 
security, particularly in view of its longstanding relationships with the US and NATO. With 
Norway’s positioning in the global security system at stake, the military engagement became 
more significant than the humanitarian one. Afghanistan assumed a central role in the debate 
on reforming the Norwegian military to adjust to global security developments. 
 
Simultaneously, Norway upgraded its humanitarian engagement, gradually converted it into 
more long-term forms of assistance, and designated Afghanistan as one of its development 
‘partner countries’ from 2004 onwards. On the assistance front, Norway has first and 
foremost emphasized support to the transitional administration, both directly and through its 
engagement in donor coordination. Otherwise, Norway as a donor is engaged in a variety of 
areas. Norway was also at the forefront in re-establishing a diplomatic presence, with 
representatives in place in time for the inauguration of the Afghan Interim Authority on 22 
December 2001. 
8.1. The Military Engagement 
The Norwegian government was fully behind the US-led war against the Taliban regime and 
Al Qaida, and moved quickly to offer Norwegian military resources, including special forces, 
F-16 jet fighters, and one Hercules C-130 transport aircraft with personnel (see table 7.1).125 
There was no precedent for deploying Norwegian military forces beyond Europe other than 
in peacekeeping operations. The underlying premise of Norway’s engagement, however, was 
the same that had informed the country’s security policy since the late 1940s, i.e. that full 
support to the US and to NATO was essentia l for a reciprocal security guarantee.  
 
The Norwegian engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was endorsed by the 
overwhelming majority in parliament. In and out of parliament, public debate was 
surprisingly limited given the dramatic reorientation of Norwegian defense policy signaled by 
the Afghanistan deployment. Some argued that the intervention itself was not in accordance 
with international law, and there was some debate about whether Norwegian personnel on the 
ground operated under US command in engagements that might violate the rules of war 
regarding injuring and killing civilians. By the autumn of 2003, Norway quietly wound up its 
engagement in OEF, while simultaneously endorsing the need for the operation to continue. 
The government subsequently focused on its contribution to the now NATO-led ISAF force.  
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Table 8.1: Budget allocations for Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan, 2001 – 
2003 (in million NOK).126 
 
Special forces (90 million in 2003**)     190 
Mine clearance experts         29 
National support unit (Kandahar)          2 
Transport aircraft Hercules C-130 (Kirgizistan)    105 
Armoured personnel carriers (15)        24 
Jet fighters F-16 (incl. ammunition costs)*     564 
Additional costs – extended deployment period*      29,5 
Total – OEF        943,5 
 
Transport control unit (Kabul)        12 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team         5 
Additional costs – extended deployment period*      13 
CIMIC**          25 
Surgical unit**          35 
Telemark Task Force**           50 
Total – ISAF        140 
 
Liaison officers (Tampa, Florida)        38 
Strategic communication units (2)      120 
Procurement and adaptation of equipment       26 
Additional costs – extended deployment period*      42 
Total – shared resources OEF/ISAF      226 
 
Sea patrolling, Mediterranean (NATO support)      16 
 
GRAND TOTAL                   1325,5 
 
 
Note: Costs marked * refer to Stortingsproposisjon nr. 80, where 300 million out of a total of 648 million was 
covered through an extraordinary grant; the remaining 348.5 million were covered through reallocations within 
the ordinary budgets (including the state budget for 2003). Costs marked ** refer to allocations for 2003 and 
2004 , which were part of the ordinary state budget, with the CIMIC team running till February 2004, the 
Surgical unit to March 2004, and the Telemark Task Force to July 2004. Costs for the participation in a British-
led PRT (see below) are not included. 
  
 
Norway’s contribution to the ISAF mission in Kabul started in early 2002, and was strikingly 
modest compared to the OEF contribution. The mission basically included a transport control 
unit and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. By March 2003, Norway had 
deployed a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) unit, by August the same year a surgical 
hospital unit, and by November – in time for the Constitutional loya jirga – a company that 
could function as a so-called Quick Reaction Force. The CIMIC deployment – with the 
traditional mandate of ‘winning hearts and minds’ for the larger secur ity force – engaged in 
some minor reconstruction projects in the surroundings of Kabul. 127 The projects were 
financed from the budget for humanitarian activities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Ministry exercised tight control by insisting on approving each and every new project. The 
surgical hospital unit formed part of ISAF’s larger medical capacity and was set up to serve 
ISAF personnel. 128 Both the CIMIC team and the surgical unit were clearly at the ‘soft end’ 
of ISAF’s responsibilities; Norway’s ‘sharp end’ contribution had mainly been to the OEF. 
 
Having wound up its OEF engagement in early November 2003, the government announced 
its intention to strengthen the ISAF contribution by sending a company from the so-called 
Telemark battalion – which consists of professional soldiers trained for international 
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peacekeeping missions – initially to contribute to security during the Constitutional loya 
jirga, but with an eight-month mandate.129 The decision was taken swiftly, in response to a 
request from NATO’s secretary-general during a meeting of NATO defense ministers. It was 
clearly at the ‘sharp end’ of ISAF’s responsibilities, for which it had often proved far more 
difficult to find volunteers than for the softer end. In view of the experience of threats and 
intimidation during the Emergency loya jirga in the summer of 2002, it was also a 
symbolically important decision, despite the fact that the mandate was limited to security at 
the perimeter of the meeting tent. At the conclusion of the loya jirga, the company took 
responsibility for security in parts of Kabul. 
 
The question of a possible Norwegian contribution to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) moved to the top of the policy agenda in the latter half of 2003. When the Defense 
and Foreign Affairs ministers spoke in parliament on 15 December 2003, they left little doubt 
that Norway would contribute to a PRT, and this was confirmed during the meeting of NATO 
defense ministers in Munich on 6 February 2004.130 Norway, alongside Sweden, would 
contribute to a UK-led team of an estimated 200 persons, of whom 30 would be Norwegian. 
The clear Norwegian wish to work closely with the UK is significant in that the British PRT 
model was seen as being much less problematic than the US one (see chapter 6). From 
Norway’s side, there is insistence that a PRT should first and foremost focus on security 
(possibly including security sector reform), while liaising with NGOs and government 
agencies that will implement reconstruction programs. Norway’s contribution is also 
conditional on being under the ISAF mandate, governed by NATO. While acknowledging 
some of the weaknesses of the PRT concept, Norwegian defense circles view the PRTs as a 
potentially new model for peace support operations that require less money and personnel 
than conventional operations. 
8.2. Assistance 
Afghanistan had been a major recipient of Norwegian humanitarian aid throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, with the funds divided about equally between the UN and Norwegian NGOs. 
However, the events of 9/11 changed Norwegian engagement on the assistance side as well.  
 
Norway held the chairmanship of the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) in 2002, a donor 
coordination forum established in 1997 in the absence of an internationally recognized 
government in Afghanistan. With the defeat of the Taliban, ‘Afghan leadership’ became the 
new guiding principle in the international aid community, and the ASG was dissolved at the 
end of 2002. The Afghan government played a central role in the new Consultative Group 
(CG) structure for aid coordination. 131 The Norwegian government early on argued that the 
trust funds established to support the transitional administration and reconstruction were an 
important vehicle for realizing the principle of ‘Afghan leadership’, and set a positive 
example by channeling a large part of its own support through the trust funds.  
 
The overarching priority for Norwegian assistance has been to move from humanitarian aid 
to more long-term assistance for reconstruction and development. Here, Norway’s new 
budget line for transitional assistance, instituted in 2002 as a response to the need for flexible 
funds at the interface between emergency and development assistance, was put to test.132 
From the time of the Bonn meeting onwards, Norway has given considerable sums to support 
the new Afghan administration, including funding of salaries and other operating costs. While 
this demonstrates a useful flexibility in assistance programming, it is unclear to what extent 
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Norway has simultaneously pressed for necessary reforms of Afghanistan’s public sector. By 
late 2003, it was clear that badly needed public administration reform had hardly started.  
 
 
Table 8.2: Norwegian Assistance to Afghanistan 2001 – 2004 (in million NOK) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
(budget) 
Humanitarian assistance; peace & 
reconciliation; emergency 
293 220 120 approx. 80 
Transitional assistance  90 120 120 
- Multilateral assistance 
- Clearance of arrears to the IFIs 
- NORAD: long term development 
assistance to NGOs 
- Regional allocation for long term 
development assistance (partner country) 
Total: Long term assistance 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
18 
20 
 
 
20 
 
 
40 
35 
75 
 
25 
 
 
135 
10 
 
 
25 
 
68 
103 
TOTAL 311 350 375 303 
 
 
Examining the CG structure in late 2003, we find that Norway had announced its interest in 
the following sectors:133  
 
- Education and Vocational Training 
- Livelihoods and Social Protection 
- Public Administration and Economic Management 
- Returnees and IDPs 
- National Police and Law Enforcement 
- Mine Action 
 
In addition to these, Norway is listed on three cross-cutting themes: gender, humanitarian 
affairs, and monitoring and evaluation. As a whole, this suggests, for a small donor, a quite 
broad engagement that raises concern about strategy, effectiveness and potential impact. The 
formal guidelines of the ATA call on donors to sign up for only 3-4 groups. 
 
After the Taliban was defeated, the international aid community generally and consciously 
toned down the human rights issue. Norway initially, and still in principle, has not done so. In 
October 2002, at a time when the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHCR) 
suffered from financial problems, Norway disbursed a sum of NOK 4 million directly to the 
commission. The money would ordinarily have gone through UNAMA (or UNDP), but 
UNAMA had already taken a low profile on human rights and reconciliation issues, and the 
Norwegian disbursement could well be seen as a serious critique. Subsequently Norway 
continued to promote human rights issues in a variety of forums, but appears to have fallen 
more into line with UNAMA, where human rights are toned down in the interest of stability. 
Norway’s support to the AIHRC, to the Constitutional loya jirga, and to the UNDP-organized 
voter registration may nonetheless be seen as a larger package of support to human rights and 
democracy building, albeit being both gradualist and low-key in its approach.  
 
The engagement of Norwegian NGOs in Afghanistan dates back to the early 1980s. By 
September 2001 only the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee and Norwegian Church Aid had 
a presence in Afghanistan. These NGOs had a variety of project activity in many parts of the 
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country, with NCA primarily implementing their projects through Afghan NGOs. During 
2002, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Redd Barna established themselves in Kabul, 
addressing rights and protection issues for, respectively, refugees and children. Thus, the 
Norwegian government’s policy is that the continued engagement of NGOs provides an 
essential complement to a currently weak Afghan government administration and is likely to 
be a vital resource for reconstruction.  
 
From 2004 onwards, Afghanistan is designated as one of Norway’s development ‘partner 
countries’.134 Given the fragility of the peacebuilding process, which was acknowledged in 
the 2004 state budget of Norway, this is a high-risk decision that must be understood in a 
broader context.135 The decision was taken in a situation where Norway’s engagement in Iraq 
was politically controversial at home, and reflected the need to demonstrate to the US a 
Norwegian commitment to the ‘war on terror’ without engaging heavily in Iraq. Additionally, 
the government pointed to the strong tradition and experience of Norwegian assistance in 
Afghanistan through a long-term humanitarian engagement (particularly via Norwegian 
NGOs) and its ASG chairmanship, arguing that this would translate into a trusting 
relationship with key actors in the Afghan cabinet.  
8.3. Conclusions 
Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan, both militarily and in other forms of assistance, must 
be understood in a post 9/11 context when a contribution to the US-led ‘war on terror’ was 
seen as a key element in the country’s security and foreign policy. This largely explains why, 
from late 2001 to early 2002, the OEF engagement was relatively extensive, but also why, 
following a reconsideration of the difficulties associated with a possible contribution to the 
US occupation in Iraq, Norway opted for a broad and long-term engagement in Afghanistan 
and a very small military contingent in Iraq. 
 
In the security sector, the first, and very costly engagement, was mostly within the framework 
of the US-led Coalition forces. In a second phase, from the autumn of 2003, Norway ended 
its OEF involvement and upgraded its involvement in ISAF, most importantly by sending a 
small contingent to assist with security duties during the Constitutional loya jirga (CLJ). This 
was a significant decision in that it was important to safeguard the proceedings of the CLJ 
and was in line with Norway’s overall objective of providing support to the political 
transition arrangements. As for the proposed PRTs, which are likely to be deployed in 2004, 
the mandate remains poorly defined, making it difficult to foresee what the impact – positive 
or negative – will be on the ground. 
 
On the humanitarian side, Norway has a strong profile of supporting the transitional 
administration, and a gradually waning profile on human rights issues. Generally, the 
government strives to be a constructive and flexible aid donor in its support for the 
transitional administration. However, the Norwegian assistance is currently spread over a 
large number of sectors, raising issues of effectiveness and impact. With the recent 
designation of Afghanistan as a ‘partner country’, maintaining a sharper profile in priority 
niches may be a wiser strategy. One such niche – where Norway already has a certain basis – 
is human rights and reconciliation issues. This is obviously a demanding portfolio, yet an area 
that requires consistent attention for the peace process to move forward. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
By what standards should the peacebuilding policies pursued in Afghanistan during the past 
two years be judged? Three standards are relevant, ranging from the simple to the complex: 
 
· The text of the Bonn Agreement itself: Were the goals outlined in the Agreement met 
and the strategies followed? Was the timetable adhered to? 
· The relevance of the Bonn Agreement to the Afghan situation: Was the Bonn 
Agreement a good script for creating security and rebuilding the Afghan state and 
economy?  
· The implicit political and ethical standards of intervention to change a regime: Did the 
intervention and related assistance strategies improve the political, socio-economic 
and security situation of Afghanistan? 
9.1. The Bonn Agreement  
The Bonn Agreement has two distinct parts. The preamble sets out the overriding goals of the 
transition process, i.e. the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a society with a fully 
representative government “in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism 
and social justice.” As ideal guides for the transition process, these goals have no timetable 
for implementation. The second and main part of the agreement is a precise outline of 
structures and processes to be realized within two and a half years. This is a strategy of action 
and is described as a “step towards” the ultimate goals. 
 
Much of the political debate over developments in Afghanistan in the two years after Bonn 
reflects the uncertain relationship between these two parts of the Agreement. Advocates of 
modernism, human rights and rapid democratization point to the preamble and fault the 
transition process for being far from the ideals. They note that human rights violations remain 
a nationwide problem. There is no accountability mechanism for addressing massive human 
rights violations and war crimes in even the recent past. Democratic procedures have been 
manipulated, especially at the first Emergency loya jirga, and the selection of candidates to 
both assemblies was tainted by intimidation. The constitutional process had the character of a 
quick-fix legitimacy exercise. The rights of women - while formally acknowledged in law 
and some public institutions - continue to be sharply constrained by tradition, religion and 
politics.  
 
On the other hand, it is noted, a strategy of action differs from ultimate goals. The main part 
of the Bonn Agreement, and arguably its spirit, was to provide for a transitional mechanism 
to fill the void after US intervention brought down the Taliban regime. The main concern 
then, as now, was to maintain the momentum of the political process, and above all to prevent 
backsliding to the conditions of civil war that had preceded the rise of the Taliban and 
Afghan-based international terrorism.  In this perspective, to have established a functioning 
interim government that operates within a framework of legal legitimacy, while 
simultaneously moving from relief to reconstruction, is a major achievement. To have 
accomplished this within the two and a half year time-frame stipulated in the Agreement is 
even more so. 
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The movement from armed conflict to political competition - while incomplete - has by any 
standard been the most important achievement in the past two years. The political arena has 
been reestablished and functions. Alongside it are other tell- tale signs of peace – a 20-30% 
economic growth rate in 2003 (although greatly helped by good rainfall in two successive 
seasons), burgeoning trade, a construction boom in the capital city, an energized civil society, 
and reopened schools. The achievement is in no small measure due to the investment of the 
international community in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. The international 
commitment is expressed in military, political and economic terms and, despite a controversy 
over the adequacy of external funding, shows little sign of abating. Another main cause of 
progress is the widespread war-weariness of the Afghan people, and a related determination 
by many to use the last, US-led war as a stepping stone towards a better future. 
  
On the negative side of the balance sheet are problems related to the security situation and the 
decision of the US-led coalition to continue to wage war on unspecified elements of the 
Taliban and Al Qaida in the southeastern region of the country. The continued low-level war 
has complicated virtually all aspects of the peacebuilding agenda implicitly endorsed in 
Bonn. US forces collaborate with local militia commanders in hunting down suspected 
enemy units, thereby nurturing the warlord phenomenon and related problems. The practice 
was reconfirmed as policy in early 2004, when it was announced that the US would train and 
equip Afghan militia forces to help fight terrorism. In pursuit of the war, the US has 
subordinated matters of democratic development and human rights to the needs of a close 
working relationship with Afghan military commanders on both the national and local levels. 
Far from subduing the militants, however, the Coalition forces have faced increasing attacks, 
as have ‘soft targets’ in their areas of operation. The result has been generalized insecurity in 
large parts of the area bordering on Pakistan. 
 
The contradictions between waging war and simultaneously trying to build peace are clearly 
manifested with respect to elections and reconstruction. Growing insecurity had in late 2003 
led to the suspension of international aid activities and UN missions in many parts of the 
South and Southeast. For similar reasons, it was uncertain if the planned registration of voters 
and the 2004 elections could be held as scheduled in these areas. The affected provinces 
constitute the Pashtun heartland, where many people feel they have lost out in the political 
transition. By early 2004, there was mounting concern that insecurity, suspension of 
reconstruction projects, and political suspicion that villagers were Taliban sympathizers 
might generate a sharply negative dynamic and effectively create ‘rogue provinces’..  In this 
respect, the ideals in the preamble of the Bonn Agreement appear to have become more 
distant over the past two years. 
 
By the standard of Bonn ‘as a strategy of action,’ the main shortcomings during the past two 
years have been on the security front as well. The military forces of the Northern Alliance 
faction did not withdraw from Kabul as required by the Agreement. This circumscribed the 
role of the international peacekeeping force (ISAF), deployed in Kabul to prevent the capital 
from becoming a battlefield for competing military factions as had happened with devastating 
consequences in 1992-96. Although Kabul remained generally peaceful, it was not quite the 
neutral political ground envisaged in Bonn. The presence of the Northern Alliance forces 
intimidated both Afghan critics, who feared physical harassment, and members of the 
international community who worried that the powerful defense minister would become a 
‘spoiler’ and withdraw from the political process.  
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A related shortcoming has been the extremely slow pace of demobilization of the factional 
armies and the formation of a new national army. By early 2004, only some 2,700 of an 
estimated 100,000 soldiers had surrendered their weapons. While the Bonn Agreement 
attached no timetable to demobilization, it was hoped that the process would be well under 
way by the time of the elections, scheduled in or before June 2004. Experience from similar 
situations demonstrates that holding Western-style elections in the presence of competing and 
fully armed militias is meaningless or counterproductive. The limited progress towards 
demobilization has added to concerns about the wisdom of holding elections as scheduled. 
9.2. A Script for Peacebuilding  
As noted at the outset, conflict was embedded in the very process of rebuilding the Afghan 
state and economy. The defeated party – the Taliban – was not brought into a peace 
settlement when the war ended. Large populations associated with the regime were excluded 
from national power and treated with suspicion. Questions of integration, representation and 
distribution of benefits – central but difficult issues in the aftermath of most civil wars – 
consequently became particularly problematic. They were further complicated by the lack of 
agreement among the Afghan people on constitutive principles of state and society. Views 
differed on fundamental issues regarding the struc ture of the state (degrees of centralism), the 
relationship between state and religion, the nature of rights and the role of women, and the 
position of the monarch. The conflict generated by these divisions was sharpened by the 
continued low-level war in the South and Southeast. Hence, the period after Bonn clearly has 
not been a ‘post-conflict’ situation. Applying this widely used paradigm to Afghanistan, as 
many did, risks using ill- fitting strategies and creating unrealistic expectations. ‘Conflictual 
peacebuilding’ is a more appropriate term, and raises the question as to whether the Bonn 
Agreement and related instruments were suitable for a situation of this kind. 
 
 
The Political Transition 
 
The Bonn Agreement provided a feasible and widely accepted mechanism for bringing the 
principal armed factions, except the Taliban, into the political arena, and simultaneously 
permitted new political forces access.  The mechanisms were partly taken from the standard 
inventory of Western democratic instruments (elections, watchdog commissions, 
constitutional process), but wisely used traditional Afghan institutions as well (the loya 
jirga). 
  
The very success of bringing groups that lacked liberal traditions into the political system – 
old jihadi parties, self-styled warlords and conservative Islamists – made Afghan modernists 
and some of their international supporters fear that Islamists might use the parliamentary 
process to assert their political power, as had happened previously in Pakistan’s NWFP and, 
until the process was aborted by the military, in Algeria. It was the classic dilemma of a 
democratic system: how much freedom to participate should be allowed? The single most 
important external actor – the United States - favored strong leadership over inclusive 
participation, a preference that reflected Washington’s interests in having a firm and reliable 
regime that would support its war against the Taliban and Al Qaida.  
 
A textbook recommendation would recognize the importance of inclusive political 
mechanisms in situations of conflictual peacebuilding. The lack of agreement among Afghans 
on what kind of polity should be formed - modernist-reformist? Islamist? conservative-
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traditional? -  suggested the need for an open and inclusive political system where greater 
consensus on constitutive issues gradually could be forged over time. If properly used, 
instruments such as parliament, power-sharing formulas and appointments to state positions 
might produce a measure of power-sharing, accountability and recognition of group interests 
among all parties concerned.  
 
The two divergent views were played out in the constitutional debate on the balance of power 
between the president and the parliament, and again in the matter of the elections scheduled 
for mid-2004. The Bonn Agreement, perhaps unwisely, set a fixed timetable for the first 
elections, thereby depriving the process of some flexibility. The principle of inclusiveness 
implied  that parliamentary elections be  held as close to presidential elections as possible (as 
the new constitution states). Advocates of strong presidential leadership were willing to split 
the two. In a third perspective, postponing elections was seen as a reasonable option provided 
a serious commitment was made to develop institutional democratic capacity and proceed 
with demobilization in the meantime.  
 
The principle of inclusiveness applies to the Bonn Agreement itself. The Bonn meeting was 
highly unrepresentative, dominated by the Northern Alliance and the Pashtuns in exile. The 
traditional-conservative Pashtun society was mostly excluded, as was everybody that had 
been even remotely associated with the Taliban. No efforts were made to deal politically with 
the defeated regime and its supporters. Not surprisingly, core Taliban elements withdrew,  
regrouped and resumed the armed struggle. Much of the conservative Pashtun tribal society 
felt alienated and excluded. The transitional administration in Kabul found itself facing a 
major legitimacy problem. Arguably, a more inclusive approach at the beginning would 
probably have made for less conflict.  
 
A similar perspective is relevant to the difficult relationship between the center and the 
provinces. While not directly discussed in Bonn, the state-building policy charted by the UN 
and the internationa l community has been modernist-centrist in orientation. Apart from 
conforming to the pre-war formal structure of state administration, the approach was based on 
the assumption that the central state would be a more legitimate and benevolent power than 
the warlords. It has become increasingly obvious, however, that the desirability of building a 
central state cannot be divorced from the question of ‘who owns the state’. Key figures in the 
transitional administration are likely to remain in power well after the scheduled transition 
ends, and deep legitimacy problems persist. Until conditions for meaningful elections are 
met, an alternative approach would be to rely more on traditional modes of establishing 
legitimacy and influence vis-à-vis the provinces, including distribution of rewards, and 
schemes for revenue sharing.  
 
The Bonn Agreement called for an entirely new constitution to be written within a very short 
timeframe. A constitution was duly produced in about 6 months time. By comparison, a 
similar process in South Africa - which is held up as model of participatory constitution-
making in deeply divided societies - took 6 years. Not surprisingly, the Afghan case became a 
quick-fix, only nominally democratic process with superficial ‘public hearings’ and closed-
door, last-minute revisions in the office of the incumbent president. A longer timeframe 
might have turned the constitutional process into a genuine consensus-producing exercise. In 
the meantime an amended version of the 1964 Constitution could have remained in force.  
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Security 
 
The main role of military forces in a peacebuilding operation is to provide support for the 
political process. The adequacy of the force assigned to Afghanistan for this task – and the 
type of force deployed – have been much discussed. Often lost in the discussion is the central 
point that the medium-sized international force deployed to the capital was a critical 
demonstration of international support for the political transition, which helped avert a return 
to civil war. Given the varied security situation in the provinces, it does not necessarily 
follow that a deployment outside Kabul would have yielded commensurate benefits. 
 
Designated a ‘stabilization’ rather than a classic peacekeeping force, ISAF did not expand 
beyond Kabul for almost two years. The decision to initially limit its deployment to the 
capital was one of the most controversial clauses of the Bonn Agreement. In retrospect, it 
seems that an early deployment to other main cities would have strengthened Kabul’s 
position in relation to the local power holders. Even a low-level military presence in the main 
cities would likely have created a more neutral political space and less intimidation. Road 
patrols might well have reduced robberies of relief trucks. However, as the experience of 
ISAF in Kabul also demonstrated, the international force would likely have operated with 
some deference to the local power holders, and the impact on the general security situation 
seems uncertain. By the time  expanded deployment was no longer opposed by the US (fall 
2002), and authorized by the UN Security Council (late 2003), the security situation had 
further deteriorated in ways that made ISAF contingents in whatever place and form more 
vulnerable. In the escalating war between the Coalition forces and the militant Islamists, all 
foreign military personnel were equally targeted, as suicide attacks against ISAF personnel in 
Kabul showed. 
 
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were initially a US initiative undertaken in the 
‘winning- the-hearts-and-minds’ tradition. The PRTs encountered massive opposition from 
the NGO aid community, and doubts about the cost-effectiveness of mixing military and 
reconstruction tasks inspired an alternative British model where the teams mainly have 
security and intelligence functions. The impact of small and widely scattered teams of this 
kind remains to be seen. They can potentially contribute to the creation of islands of stability, 
thereby demonstrating that peace pays.  
  
 
Economic Reconstruction 
 
The guiding principles for reconstruction were laid down in a sequel to Bonn in meetings of 
donors and the new Afghan authorities. The standard paradigm for internationally-supported 
reconstruction in post-war situations that had developed during the 1990s was adopted, based 
on market-driven growth, an open economy and a minimalist, regulatory state. The paradigm 
was given an additional, neo- liberal twist by the powerful Minister of Finance in the 
transitional administration.  
 
The transitional administration has identified economic growth as the principal strategy for 
combating poverty, and for alleviating the sharp inequalities in wealth between as well as 
within provinces. National programs (NSP, NEEP) are small and slow in implementation. 
The major public works program to address immediate reconstruction needs and mounting 
unemployment, NEEP, had by late 2003 generated the equivalent of about one-third of a 
workday per member of the labor force. While the administration frequently blames 
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inadequate donor funding for the slow pace of reconstruction, its policy framework does not 
give priority to programs that could yield a tangible or highly visible demonstration of the 
benefits of peace. 
 
Sharp geographic differences in wealth were a major argument for creating a central state, 
which could undertake redistributive policies. For instance, Herat province last year 
generated revenues five thousand times greater than the poor province of Bamyan and about 
two thousand times the amount generated in the province of Wardak, just south of Kabul. The 
administration is anxiously trying to control locally generated revenues, but has not made an 
equally strong commitment to regional redistribution. Instead, the central ministries have 
been advised to use market mechanisms for distributing reconstruction projects and social 
services. There are no reliable figures on the aid pattern so far, and at least one poor area 
(Bamyan) has attracted numerous foreign NGOs. Nevertheless, the competitive bidding 
process will exacerbate rather than diminish present inequalities if NGOs, firms and aid 
agencies bid last on projects in backward, insecure or inaccessible areas, as they might be 
expected to do.  
 
A similar market approach has been used to build absorptive capacity in the public and 
private sector. The transitional administration has made extensive use of foreign expertise to 
quickly enhance the capacity to administer and implement reconstruction programs and 
deliver social services. While capacity enhancement will enable the government to effectively 
channel large amounts of foreign aid into the reconstruction process, the strategy is costly and 
hardly sustainable in the long run. Building local capacity – as distinct from enhancement 
through import - is a long-term and more difficult task and has not received similar attention.   
 
The consequences of an unmodified market approach have been studied in other countries 
where not only the economy, but also the society, had to be reconstructed. Typical findings 
include limited provision of social goods, large pockets of poverty, and high levels of 
violence (in the form of crime). A pure market approach to reconstruction is also inadequate 
because it fails to incorporate political factors that affect the peace process, notably issues of 
equity, inclusion, political accountability and legitimacy.  
 
The magnitude of aid has become an increasingly controversial issue in relations between 
Afghanistan’s transitional administration and international donors. The administration 
maintains that donors should channel huge amounts of funds into the reconstruction process 
in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a ‘narco-mafia state’. Yet it is highly 
questionable that an infusion over the next few years of say, nearly 30 billion dollars as now 
requested, would by itself bring peace. How the aid is being spent is more important, as is the 
institutional context of local capacity and reform. Large inflows of aid raise another 
fundamental issue. The Afghan state is fast becoming a rentier state funded by foreign 
governments.  Dependence on foreign funding of the kind envisaged in the next seven-year 
period will necessarily generate primary accountability of the Afghan government towards its 
foreign patrons. As such, a rentier structure works fundamentally at cross purposes to the 
main political objective of Bonn, which is to create a government that is accountable to its 
own people. As an Afghan observer asked: “How can we Afghans claim to be in the driver’s 
seat when there is someone in the backseat that both draws the map and tells us where to go? 
” 
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9.3. The Responsibilities of Intervention  
The firm commitment by the international community to create a stable and peaceful 
Afghanistan has helped prevent a return to protracted civil war, but creating conditions for 
economic, political and social progress have been more difficult.  In parts of the country the 
fall of the Taliban has meant relative peace and promise of prosperity. In other parts, life has 
not changed dramatically. The civil wars of the 1990s, it will be recalled, entailed a 
devastating battle for Kabul and intense fighting as well as massacres in the central region 
(Bamyan) and the North (Mazar). Outside these areas, people lived, as they do now, locked in 
a grinding battle with poverty and disease, ruled by tradition and the local community, 
subject to abuse by local power holders and exposed to natural disasters. Partial surveys and 
anecdotal information on the concerns of ordinary people identify three top priorities: 
security, employment and more accountable authorities.  
 
Progress towards establishing a political arena for resolving conflicts and affirming principles 
of human rights and political liberalism has been noted. In practice, however, human rights 
have been neglected by the international community, including the UN mission, which has a 
clear mandate in this area. This neglect contrasts markedly with the Taliban period, when 
human rights violations attracted great international attention and outrage. One reason, of 
course, is that some types of rights violations have disappeared with the fall of Taliban (such 
as restrictions on education for girls, employment of women and certain civil and political 
rights). Yet it is widely acknowledged that a multiple abuses continue despite a formal 
commitment to the contrary. As a local policeman in Wardak who had been through a 
German-financed training program said, “We learn about human rights, but we don’t practice 
it.” Multiple armed factions roam the countryside. Furthermore, and in contrast to the late 
Taliban period, drug production has sharply increased despite major international efforts to 
prevent it. 
 
As noted above, rebuilding the Afghan state and economy has been complicated by the 
continuing and recently escalating war with Taliban remnants and other militant Islamists. 
Some close observers express growing pessimism about the entire peacebuilding 
undertaking. 136 The violence underscores the difficulties of effecting regime change through 
armed intervention, particularly when undertaken as part of a global ‘war on terror.’  
9.4. The Policy Agenda Ahead 
A continued international commitment seems necessary to prevent a return to civil war in 
Afghanistan, but there is no clear recipe for how to move from preventing war to creating a 
better peace. The analysis so far suggests a few guidelines: 
 
· Refocus and limit the war against the militants so as to reduce the negative impact on 
the peacebuilding agenda. Distinguish between the ‘national terrorists’ (the Taliban) 
and the ‘international terrorists’ (which the Afghans call ‘the Arabs’), and to the 
extent possible address the grievances of the former with political means.  
 
· Emphasize institutional reforms and local capacity building as a prerequisite for a 
large influx of new funds. Focus on the effective use of funds to alleviate current 
problems rather than on counterfactual scenarios of Afghanistan becoming a ‘narco-
mafia state.’ Recognize that the dividing line between ‘reconstruction’ and 
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‘development’ is becoming very thin, particularly when planning is linked to the 
Millennium Development Goals.   
 
· Address issues that have been relatively neglected in the reconstruction process so far, 
including human rights, anti-poverty programs, and regulatory policies that promote 
greater equality and equity in sharing the benefits of reconstruction. This is especially 
important to reduce the likelihood that poor and insecure areas will become ‘rogue 
provinces.’ 
 
· Anchor the peacebuilding process more firmly in the regional context, inter alia by 
creating an institutional forum for cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. 
 
As for the role of Norway, the government should consider consolidating its present aid 
portfolio - which judged by CG membership is rather dispersed for a small actor on the 
Afghan scene - and concentrate on an identifiable niche where the Norwegian contribution 
can make a difference. This strategy was followed with some success earlier, when Norway 
chaired the Afghan Support Group in the transition from humanitarian aid under the 
ostracized Taliban regime to a comprehensive assistance under the new authorities 
collectively supported by the international community. At the present juncture, a niche that 
would harmonize with overall Norwegian aid policies would be one that gives voice to the 
relatively neglected areas in the present reconstruction policy.  
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Summary 
 
This report charts the aid policies pursued in Afghanistan since 
late 2001 aimed at building peace in a country devastated by 
two decades of conflict. 
The report presents the four pillars of the peacebuilding 
design and examines the national and international context for 
what is termed as a ‘conflictual peacebuilding.’ The state-
building process as well as the relief and reconstruction 
policies are discussed in more detail, followed by an 
examination of the political transition process and how the rule 
of law has been established. The national security situation and 
the international and regional context s are reviewed as is 
Norway’s role in the peacebuilding process. 
 The report proposes policy guidelines for the policy 
agenda ahead: 
· Refocus and limit the war against the militants so as to 
reduce the negative impact on the peacebuilding 
agenda.   
· Emphasize institutional reforms and local capacity 
building as prerequisites for a large influx of new 
funds.   
· Address issues that have been relatively neglected in 
the reconstruction process so far, including human 
rights, anti-poverty programs, and regulatory policies 
that promote greater equality and equity in sharing the 
benefits of reconstruction  
· Anchor the peacebuilding process more firmly in the 
regional context, inter alia by creating an institutional 
forum for cooperation between Afghanistan and its 
neighbors. 
Norway should consider consolidating its present aid portfolio 
and concentrating on an identifiable niche where the 
Norwegian contribution can make a difference.   
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